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Cancellation of Debt and
Related Transactions
DOUGLAS A. KAHN* AND JEFFREY H. KAHN**
Abstract
If a taxpayer borrows money, the borrowed funds are not included in the
taxpayerIs gross income. 'ihat treatment is proper even though the taxpayer
has increased his assets by the amount he borrowed because he also has cre-
ated a corresponding Itiability to pay back the loan. 'Ihe taxpayer's net: wealth
has not increased. 'The more difficult and interesting questions arise when the
taxpayer fails to repay the loan. At first blush, it would appear that upon can-
cellation of a loan, the taxpayer should have income for the amount that was
cancelled. However, the current tax treatment is not that simple. A number
of exceptions exist to the straightforward treatment under which the cancel-
lation requires the taxpayer to recognize income. Some of those exceptions
reflect an application of normal tax principles while others exist for program-
ruAtic pU rposes. 'ihose exceptions make the tax treatment of cancellation of
debt particularly complex.
'ihe goal of this Article is to set out the tax treatment of cancellation of
debt, including the many exceptions that apply, it first reviews the history
of the cancellation of debt rules, which helps explain how we arrived at the
current treatment, It then covers the current statutory treatment of cancella-
tion of debt as well as the many commoln law rules (such as the transactional
approach and the tax benefit rule) that apply.
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I. Introduction
Ifa taxpayer borrows money, the borrowed funds are not included in the
taxpayer's gross income. 'ihat treatment is proper even though the taxpayer
has increased his assets by the amount he borrowed because he also has cre-
ated a corresponding liability to pay back the loano 'Ihe taxpayer's net: wealth
has not increased. The more dificult and interesting questions anise when the
taxpayer fails to repay the loan. At first blush, it would appear that upon can--
cellation of a loan, the taxpayer should have income for the amount that was
cancteled. However, the current tax treatment is not that simple. A number
'his ticxatment is part of the common law of iaxaton Whle thec is ro statutory provi-
Sion for this Cxciusion, courss have always held that borrowed funds arc not included in the
raxpayer's income. See. eg,, Cormissione v. Tufts, 46i U.S 300, 307 (983). Thfie lincrnal
Revenue Service (Service) has uniformiv agrccd with this treatmrnt.
'See lf!., , US,1J.S. at 312.
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of exceptions exist to the straightforward treatment under which the cancel-
lation requires the taxpayer to recognize income. Some of those exceptions
reflect an application of normal tax principles while others exist for program-
matk purposes. 'Ihose except ions make the tax treatment of cancellation of
debt particularly complex.
'Ihe goal of this Article is to set out the tax treatment of canceliation of debt,
including the many exceptions that appx. in Part 11, we review the history of
the doctrine, which helps explain how we arrived at the current treatment° In
Part 1II, we describe the current statutory treatment of cancellation of debt
and ts rclated issues in Part IV, wc discuss the tax rules that apply when the
canceflation constitutes a gift or a contribution to capital from the creditor.
In Part V, we briefly review the tax benefit rule and its etfect on cancellation
of debt. In Part VI, we describe the transactional approach to cancellation of
debt and highlight when it is appropriate to use. In Part VII, we review the
tax treatment when the debtor has a mixed sale and cancellation of indebted-
ness, 'Ihe final part reviews the treatment of a decedent's installmen t note.
1. Development of the Doctrine
The general rule is that the cancellation of a debt for less than adequate
consideration causes the debtor to recognize ordinary income in the amount
of debt that was forgiven.' Section 61(a)(12) provides that gross income
includes "[i]ncome from discharge of indebtedness.' '1this doctrine is referred
to by several terms which are used interchangeably-namely "cancellation
of indebtedness or debt," "discharge of debt," and "'forgiveness of debt." In
this Article, we often refer to it as "cancellation of debt" or by its acronym
"COD"
To understand how the COD doctrine applies, it is useful to go back in
time and trace the development of the doctrine,
A. Kerbaughi-Emnpire Deicion
in 1926, the Supreme Court decided the Rerbaugh-Empire case.' Prior to
World V ar 1, the taxpayer in that case had borrowed money from a German
bank. The loan was made in marks, and the repayment was to be made in
marks. 'Ihe taxpayer converted the borrowed marks to dollars and invested
them in a transaction that resulted in a loss. 6 The taxpayer repaid the loan
after the war, As a resuk ot Germnany's deftat, the marks had a much lower
dollar value than the value that marks had at the time the [oan was made.
'The Government contended that the repayment with marks of a lesser vaiue
'I.R.C. § 61 a) (2).
'§ 61(a) (12).
5Bowers v. Kczbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170 (1926).
6f4 at 172.
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constituted a cancellation of indebtedness that caused the taxpayer to recog-
nize incorrte
7
The Supreme Court held the taxpayer did not recognize income, but the
reasoning was riot entireiy clear. One possible ground for the decision was
that a cancellation of a debt does not cause income.' The Supreme Court
reipudiated that position five years later in Airby Lumber.9 Subsequent to the
KIrby Lumber decision, there was no dispute that cancellation of debt can
cause income recognition, but the question of tInder what circumstances
income is recognized proved to be a troubling issue.
A second ground on which AIerbaugh--Ernire was decided was that the tax-
payer did not recognize income because the transaction as a whole resulted
in a loss due to the losses incurred when the taxpayer invested the borrowed
f-nds." This use of a "transactional approach" in that context-that is, 'ook-
ing at not only the loan itsell but also what happened to the loan proceeds ------
was rightw-ily repudiated by the Supreme Court five years later in its 1931
decision in Burnet i. San/2ord & Brooks C0oLi
After the two 1931 Supreme Court decisions, it was clear that the Kerbaugh-
Empire case had been wrongly decided. Wghy then is the case worth noting?
Because the case was wrongly decided, a transactional approach to COD
issues was saddled with a bad reputation. 'lb the contrary. as we will see, a
transactional approach to COD situations is appropriate and proper. Whie
the rnanner i n which the Court applied a transactional approach in Kerbaugh-
Empire was wrong, the approach is valid when applied correct'y.
B. 1he Kirby Lumber Decision and the Raionale for rhe Rule
'Ihe landmark 1931 case Airbi; Lumber13 established that canceflation of
debt can constitute income. Unfortunate4, although the result reached in
that case was correct, what was taken to be the reasoning of the opinion
is flawed. Because of that flawed apparent reasoning, it took subsequent
courts many years to reach an analysis that applied the rule accurately. ']he
meandering and sometimes irreconcilable results reached in cases after Kirby
L umber are attributable to the courts trying to deal with the application of the
71J at 173
bhic (-our, stated that the "tranaction here in question dd not result in gain froin capi.-
tal and Iabor . . . A it 175. This Ianguagc refers to the defi-ition of income from earlier
Supreme Courtcases. See Eisnr ,v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 20)7 (1 919). Seaso Vukasovich,
tnc, v. Commmissioner, 790 .2d 1409 1415-16 (9th Cir 1986) (staring that one of the hod-
ings in Kerbaugh--E.pire was that cancellation of indebtedness is not inco, me). As noted in the
text, the supreme- (-olrt later repud.ared this holding in United States v' Kirby Lumber (o
284 U.S, 1 (1931it.
9284 US. 1 (1931.
°Kerbigh-]ape, 271 U.S. at 175 ("[hle result of the whole transacton -was a toss."')
282 U.S. 359. 364 -65 (1931). See ,.tho Vukasoei. 790 L2d ar 14i 6 (stating the holding
of Kerbtrgh- Tpir.e had been repudiated),
'2For a discussion of the transactional approach, see infra Part VL
13284 U.S. 1 (1931),
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Supreme Court's deemed rationale to situations where the COD rule should
not apply
in Kirby Lnaiber, the taxpayer had sold bonds, which effectiveiy is the bor-
rowing of" mione Later that sane yeat, the taxpayer purchased some of
those bonds for a price that was significantly less than the price at which it
had sold them." 'he Court: upheld the Government's contention that the dif-
ference in the amount paid by the taxpayer and the amount it received when
it sold its bonds was cancellation of debt income. 17 in its very brief opinion, it
appeared that the Court's rationale was based on a net worth approach,' The
Court noted that, unlike what happened in KerbauVh- Finpire, tfhe transaction
taken as a whole resulted in a gain for the taxpayer.", in effect, the case seemed
to say that the taxpayer had income because the reduction of the amount of
his iiability resulted in an increase in his net worth.
A net worth approach is far too broad. ihere are numerous situations where
a debt is cancelled and the taxpayer's net worth is increased thereby, and yet it
would be wrong to treat the reduction of the debt as income to the taxpayer.
For example, Jim promises in writing to make a donation of $20,000 to the
Notre Dame University at the end of the next year. Under state law, Jim's
promise in writing is enforceable by the charitable donee. in February of the
next year, Jim suffers losses in a business venture, and so it would be a hard--
ship for him to satisf- the debt. Jim is solvent, however. Jim asks Notre Dame
to accept a payment of $5,000 in fil[ satisfaction of the debt. Notre Dame
agrees, and so $15,000 of jim's legal iiabilik is forgiven. Obviousiy, Jim has
an increase in net worth. However, realisticaly, all that has occorred is that
Jim's plan to make a gift of $20,000 was reduced to a gift of only $5,000. Jim
should not recognize any income thereb>'
One way to analyze the above situation is to say that when the entire trans-
action is examined, what occurred is that Jin gave $5,000 to the university
"See Boris I. Bittker & Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Income Fror the Discharge uji'1Ydebted-
aess: !he Progeny of'Unived Stau-s v. Krby [ mber Co., 66 (.i. L. RV. 11 t59 i165 (1978)
("Ite tax rreatmernt of debt discharges would have beer muci simrpler if it had been based at
the oUtset on the ranio Inale that borrowed Tirnds arc exctuded from gross incomne when received
because of rhe assumpion that rhey wil be nepad in full a nd that a tax adjusntent is required
when this assumption proves erroneous.').
5Kir' Lvmber. 28A 1U.S at 2.
7I. art 3.
"iary rouprs ani oirnentarors concluded that net worth was dhe basis of the Coult's
decision in Kirhv. Lumber. See, ... Zarin v. Commissioner, 92'T.C. 1084. 1l)93 (1989), reva'
ON atberground;, 916 E2d 110 (3d Cir. 1990). '[1e majority opinion of th- -ITx Court in ai
acknowledgcd that a ret worth justification for ihc COD rule is too broad, 92 T.C, 1084 at
109. in P]resbar V. 'onmjm;i;one, 16' i.3d 1323 , 1327 (0th (ir. 1999), ,he ']mth Circuit
noted rhat one of the ratonales f6o die KSr, "Jrnber decision is an irncaease in ner worth.
"Kirby f unmer, 28- U.S. at 2 ("Here there was no shtrinkage of assets nd the taxpayer
made a clear gain")
2'As carly as 1932, the Second Circuit noted that there wound be no income in a similar
hpothencal situnation. See C onmnsionjer v Rail joint (o., 61 L2d75J (2d r 1932),
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instead of the original plan to give it $20,000.. This can be characterized as
a transactional approach even though it is very diffrent from the transac-
tional approach taken by the Supreme Court in Krerbaugh-Empi'e." This
transactional approach was adopted in some cases 22 but not in orhers° When
adopted, it was sometimes treated as an exception to the general rule that
COD i ncorrme is taxable. As we discuss below, the courts and the Service
adopted other exceptions when situations warranted it. As a result, there
became a kind of hodgepodge of cases that were difcult to reconcile.
it would not be necessary to create a number of exceptions to the COD
rule if the rule were correctly defined.'- 'Tb defte the rule, consider a very
different rationale for its existence. When someone borrows money, the hot-
rower does riot recognize income because it is assumed that the borrower will
repay the loan. in effect, the debt prevents the borrower from recognizing
incore because of the assumption that the loan will be repaid. If any parr of
the debt is forgiven, it then becomes clear that the assumption of a repayment
of that part of the debt was mistaken. So, the forgiveness of the debt removes
the obstacle to tax the borrower on the amount of the loan that would have
been income when borrowed if there had rtot then been an obligation to
repay it is not the debtors increase in net worth that is taxable; rather, it is a
tax on thc amount that previously was thou-11t to have been borrowed and
turned out to have just been an enrichment of the "borrower." Consequenty,
the forgiveness of a debt should be income only to the extent that the debt
had prevented the debtor from recognizing income in a prior period or had
provided the debtor with some tax benefit such as a tax deduction or a basis
in property. Applying that approach to the Notre Dame situation described
above, the $20,000 debt did not prevent Jim from recognizing income nor
did it provide him with a tax benefit:"" Therefore, there is no reason to tax Jim
on the cancellatiort of any of that debt.
While some of the common law exceptions to the COD rule would be
superfluous if the rule were correctly described, not all of them would be
unnecessary. For example, the exception for insolvency or bankruptcy" was
adopted for a very different: reason and( would not become redundant if the
correct standard were used. it should be noted that, while some courts have
"For mire discussion of the transactional approach, ee inf a Parr VI.
2''e, e.g. Bradford v. Conmnssioner, 233 F2d 935 (6h Cir. 1056), revg 22 EC 1057
(954). See alsa Conrnissioner v. Rail Join- (o., 61 E2d 751 (2d (i. 1932) yiUpporting the
transact mol approach).
2, is rior to say that the rule would theeby be "simple" ro aprly. See Lawrence Zelenak,(aoecellantin -f/dn, rdcbttedv, in~come n' h acr~ozaiAcco g, 20 'J'A ax REX. 277, 280
(2009).
A girt to a ch arity is not deductible unil paid even if the donor reports its income or! the
accrual method. So, jim did riot qualify ftr a tax deduction when le cieatcd a legal obligaton
for him to rnake a payment to the school.
"See inra Parr iL AA.
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begun to adopt the statement of the COD rule described above, that standard
has not been embraced by every cou rt, 26
C, ]he Pre- 1981 and Pre- 987 Statutory D'rTra!
Prior to the adoption of the Bankruptcy Tax Act of' 1980, the scope and
operation of the COD rule was deterrrined exclusively by court: decisions
(ie., common law) and by administrative rulings. The only statutory provi-
sions that dealt with COD were sections I08 and 10 17 ard their antccedents.
Those statutory provisions did not describe or limit what constitutes COD.
Instead, they provided that in certain circumstances a solvent debtor who
had COD income could elect not to recognize that income to the extent
that the debtor had basis in property 27 '-he effect of he dection was to pre-
vent income recognition and to reduce the debtor's basis in its property The
provision applied to corporate debtors arid to the debts of individuals that
were connected to that individual's property that was used in a trade or busi-
nessl ) 'Ihe amont of COD income that was excluded could not exceed
the basis that the debtor had in its qualified property.2 9 For pre-1981 years,
virtually all of the debtor's property was qualified, and the allocation of the
reduction of basis to the debtor's property was subject to an order of priority
set forth in the regulation to section 1017. From 1981 through 1986, only
depreciable property qualified for the basis reduction.") If the amount of debt
forgiven exceeded the debtor's basis in quaiificd property, the excess was taxed
as income.- As noted below, this elective provision was repealed for years
following 1986.32
Thus, prior to 1980, the determination of what constitutes COD income
was not addressed by statutes. 'uni adoption of the Ban kruptcy l x Act of
1980 amended sections 108 and 1017 so as to provide specified exceptions
to income recognition. 3 3 'uit amended version of those provisions does not
define what constiutes COD income; that task is still left to common law
and administrative construction. 'Thc amended provision establishes a num-
ber of exceptions to COD income treatment some of which are codifications
"See, e.g, Zarin v. Commissioner, 916 F.2d i 10 (3d Cir. 1990),
7I.R.C.. 108 (1976) (providing for nonrecogntionr of C;O1) inrme in cerrain circum.-
stances); I.R.C. '10 i (1976) (limiting nonrecognition io ihe exenit that the debtor had basis
in the property).
2. 108 (1976).
29§ 1017 (1976) ("Where any amount is excluded from gross incone under section 108
(relating to income from discharge of indebtedness) on account of the discharge of indebtedness
the whole or a part of the amount so excluded from gross income shall be applied in reduction
of ,he basis of any property held (whether before or after the rime of the discharge) by the
taxpayer during ary portion of the taxable year in which snuch discharge orcu red.").
"'See Bankruptcyvax A.t of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589, § I08. 94 Star. 341i.
Rev. Rul. 67-200, 1967 1 C B 15, as clarified by Rev. Rul. 70-406, 1970-2 (CB 16
2 Tax Rcf(orrn Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, § 143, 100 Stat 2085 11986).
.3Se svpra .note 30.
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of exceptions previously adopted by the courts. 4 Tlhe 1980 amendment of
t:he provision retained the election to deter income recognition and reduce
the basis of' property.
Sections 108 and 1017 were modified subsequent to thc Bankruptcy Tax
Act of 1980."' The Tax Reform Act of 1986 made a number of changes. One
of th:1e changes made was to elirnminate the provision that allowed a debtor to
elect not to recognize COD income and instead reduce the basis of prop-
erty,36 So, the general provision for an election to defer iricore no longer
exists. While there no longer is a provision for a general election of deferral,
an clection is permited for the dcferral of certain debts such as a "qualified
acquisition indebtedness" that constitutes "qualified real property business
irndebtedness.1137
II1. Current Statutory reatment
A. S.ecions 108 and 1017
As previousy noted, the two principal sections that deal with COD issues
are sections 108 and I017. Sectior 61 (a)( 12) provid tat gross income
includes "[if ncome from discharge of indebtedness,''" but it does not provide
an eXplanation of what constitutes COD incorrie or what exceptions appli,
Section 108 provides a number of exceptions to the COD rule but does not
defirne what constitutes COD. Section [017 provides for the reduction of
the basis of the debtor's property when certain exclusions of COD income
provided by section 108 are applicable.
The exceptions to COD income that are listed in section 108 are not exclu-
sive. in addition to thc statutory exclusions, common law exclusions and the
See svpra note 30.
3IR.C. .108, i017.36§§ 108, i)7
108(c), If the debt was incurred before 1093, it did not have to be an acquisition
indebtedness. 6 0 8 (,c) (B). The meaning of"'qualified ral property business ndebtednes" is
defined in section I 08(c)(3) and the mreanng of'qualified acquisition indebtedness" is defined
in section 108(c)(4). "TVe amount of this exclusion is limited to the amount of basis the debtor
had in his depreciable real property that was held immediartely before the discharge.. i08(c).
Depreciablc property is defined in section 101 7(b)(3)(B), Tlie election grei In section 017
for a debtor to treat realty held b3 him for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his
tradc or business as depreciable property does not apply to the qualified real property business
indebtedness exclusion. 101 7(b)(3)(F). 'le real property business debt exclusion is discussed
;1,a1 .]art II .A.6,
Adso, the Code provides an election for deferral over an eight- or nine-year period for the
rcacquisirion of certain debt instrumenrs when the reacquisition took place in the year 2010 or
2011. 108(i), A reacquisiionn is defned as any acquisition of art applicable debt inmstrument
by the debtor or a person retated to the debtor. 08(i)(4. An applicable debt instrument
deone belte anotherbo. I() 1
is defined as R debt instrument that was issued by R C( Corporation or by another person in
connection with the conduct ofa trade or business by that person. § 108(i)(3), Taxpayers who
rlcted the deferral need to be aware of the numerous circumstances acceterating recognition
ofedcflrred income. This Article does not discuss the deferral provision,38 .R.C(_. 5, 6 (a)(12)).
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common law application of the exclusions that the statute codified continue
to be available, However, the statutc replaces the common law e'ception for
insolvency, and the exclusion from income for insolvent debtors is deter-
rnined exclusively by he statutory provisions,'
Let as now consider the operation of sections 108 and 1017. While we will
discuss the pritcipal features of those provisions, we will not examine all of
their elements.
I . Te Defi'nitio2 o Debt
Section 108 applies only to tie cancellation of an "indebtedness" of a tax-
payer,"' For purposes of that section, an indebtedness or debt of a taxpayer
is defined as an indebtedness for which either the taxpayer is liable or as to
which the taxpayer holds property that is encumbered by that debt," In other
words, the term debt includes both recourse and nonrecourse debts.
By its terms, the definition of indebtedness in section 108(d)(1) applies
only for purposes of that secion.42 '1 The question then arises as to the defini-
rion of indebtedness for purposes of determining the scope of the provision in
section 61(a) (12) treating discharge of indebtedness as income. in a divided
decision, the Third Circuit held in Zairi that the definition of indebtedness
in section 1 08(d)(i) also applies to the meaning of the term in section 61 (a)
(12). 4 '"This is still an open question because there is only one divided decision
of a court of appeals on the issue.
2. 7e Exclusions Provided by Section 108
Section 108(a)(1) lists five discharges of debt that are not included in the
debtor's gross income, One of those five, the discharge of qualified principal
residence indebtedness, terminated at the end of the year 2014 and so is no
longer applicable. 4' 'Ihe other four exclusions are:
(1) the discharge occurs in a Title I1 case, 45
(2) the discharge occoLrs when the. debtor is insolvent (the insolvency
exclusion), 6
(3) thie discharged debt is qualified farm indebtedness, 7
42§ 108(d)(1),
3Zarm ,v, Commissioner, 916 2d 10, 113 (3d Cir. 1990). For R derailed discussion ofirle
Zarin case, see injri Part VLI
44For th t reason, we Will not disuvss rie Secion 108(a)(1 )(E) exclusion in this article.
4Section I 08(d)(2) defines "tle II case" as a "case under tile II of the United Stare C ode
(relating to bankruptcv), but ony if the taxpayer is 11nder the jurisdiction of rhe courr in such
case and the discharge ofiindebrednes is granted by the court or is pursuant to a plan approved
by tbe court."
46Section 10 8(a) 0) (B),
fhlc qualified fanrm indebtedness exclusion applies onh if rhe discharge is made by a quali-
fied person per secrion 108(g)(1).
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(4) The discharged debt is qualified real property business indebtedness."'
When these several exclusions overlap, there is an order of priority as to
which applies. The bankruptcy or Title I1 exclusion takes precedence over
the other three exclusions. 9 hat priorit is important because, while the
amount of COD that is excludable under the insolvenex exclusion is lim-
ited to the amount: of the debtors insolvenc> there is no limitation on the,
amount of COD that can be excluded when the debt is cancelled in a bank-
ruptcy case, Note that while a Title 11 case will often involve an insolvent
petitioner, there is not a complete overlap with insolvency because a debtor
need not be insolvent to file a Chapter 7 voluntary petition in bankruptcy. 5°
The insolvency exclusion rakes precedence over the exclusions for qualified
farm indebtedness and for quaifed real property business irldebtedrness, 5
That priority is important because the scope of the insolvency exception is
more extensive tMai the reach of the other two provisions. he other two
exclusions can apply to the excess of the COD that is not excluded by the
insolvency provision°
in addition to those four exclusions, section 108 provides several more
exceptions to inclusion of COD income that are discussed later in this paper.
Some of those additional items are codifications of common law exclusions.
Also, except for the insolvency exclusion, the common law exciusions con--
rinue to apply. So, Lhe statutory provisions are not exclusive.
3. 7he Con'non Law Insolvencv Exc/usion
'ihe courts initially hlid that when a debtor had COD at a tine when
he was insolvent. the debtor did not recognize income. 2 The courts defined
irsolvency as the excess of the debtor's liabilities over the fair market vatue
of his assets. 53 Those cases initially arose in circumstances where the debtor
was insolvent rimmediately before the COD took place and was still insol--
vent after the debt was forgiven. Those decisions were based on the fact that,
because the debtor was still insolvent, there had been no increase in his net
worth. Of course, the debtor's negative net worth was reduced by the forgive-
ness, but the courts did rot deeri that a sufficienrt reason to tax the debtor.
But what is the tax treatment of a debtor who was insolvent before the
COD but became solvent as a consequence of the forgiveness of the dcbt?
In that situation, the Board of Tax Appeals (the prior name of what is now
cailed the lax Court) held that the debtor recognized gross income for the
4ihe exclusion for real property business indebtedness does not apply to a debtor that is a
C2 corporation. 5 18(()D.
52 CO I1 ON BANKR-UPTC 109.02 (1 6rh ed 201 5),1§ 108(a)(2)(B).
52See, e.g., Dallas iTansfr & T]rm'rnai 'Wrehouse v. Commssioner, 70 12d 95,. 96 (5th
Cir. 1934).
53II. Th at definition of insolvency is codfiLcd in section 108(d)(3), and so the sarme dcfini-
tion is applcable under the statutory treatnnient of (;01).
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cancellation of his debt, but only to the extent of the amount by which he
became solvent. 5 In effect, the rule becare that a cancellation of a debt of an
insolvent debtor was excluded from income to the extent of the amount of
the debtors insolvcncy immediately prior to the forgiveness. 'Ihe balance of
the forgiveness constituted ordinary income to the debtor unless some other
cxclusion applied° 'This same rule was adopted by Congress in its statutory
treatment of insolvency and is set forth in section 108(a)(3).
l nder the, common law irsolvency exclusion that cxistCd prior to 1980,
the amount excluded friom the debtor's income was truly excluded as con-
trasted to a deferral. 'There were no adverse tax consequences imrposed. 'lie
amount of COD that was excluded from gross income did not cause the
loss of arty favorable tax attributes the debtor possessed. As we will see, that
changed when the Code was amended in i980.76
4. 7he Sratutory Treatmenr ofInsolvenay
ao he Amount _Ecluiedfroin Income. '-ihe cormnon law insolvency
exclusion was replaced in 1980 by a statutory provision. Section 108(a)(1)
(B) excludes frorr gross incore the cancellation of indebtedness of an inso-
vent debtor, but only to the extent of the amount of the debtor's insolvency
if-mediately before the debt was forgiven. 57 In other words, the insolvency
exclusion will not apply to an amrount of the forgiven debt that is equal to the
extent that the aggregate fair rrarket value o' the debtor's assets exceeds the
aggregate of his liabilities immediately afer the COD took place. The debtor
will be taxed on that amount unless another exclusion is appllcable. 'That
aspect of the statutory exchasion is no different from the common law rule.
Illustration 1. As of February 5, Year One, Heien had assets with an aggre-
gate value of $40,000. Helen had liabilities totaling $70,000. So Helen was
insolvent in the amount: of $30,000. On that date, one of Heler's creditors, to
whom she owed $20,000, offered to accept a payment of $5,000 in cancella-
ion of that debt. Helen accepted and made the paymnertt. Helen was thcreby
forgiven $15,000 of that debt which constituted a cancellation of indebted-
ness, Because, immediately before the COD occurred, Helen was insolvert
by more than the amount of debt that was forgiven, Helen does not recognize
any income from the COD. Heren will incur a reduction of favorable tax
attributes if she possesses any. Note that after the transaction, Helen has assets
of $35,000 and liabilities of $50,000, so she is still insolvent.
Illustration 2. As of Ju 12, Year One, Randoiph had assets with an aggre-
gate value of $1 15,000, and Randolph had Jiabilitics totaling $135,000. So,
Randolph was insolvent in the amount of' $20,000. On that date, a creditor
offered to accept a payment of $25,000 to cancel a debt of $60,000, and
54See, e.g., Lakland Grocery C. v. Cornmissioner, 316 B.T.A. 289, 292 (193/).
i' l08(a)(3).
"See ipnfi Part II.A.4.b.
5;'k 108(a)(3).
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Randolph accepted and made the payment. Randolph had cancellation of
debt of $35,000, but his isol immediately before the transaction
was only $20,000. Consequently, Randolph does not recognize income for
$20,000 of the cancelled debt, but he does recognize income fir $15,000 of
the cancelled debt. Randolph will incur a reduction of his favorable tax attri-
butes, if he possesses any, tor the $20,000 that was excluded from income.
b. 7he Reduction of Tax Attributes. As noted above, a major change
of the insolvency and bankruptcy exclusions made by the Bankruptcy Act of
1980 is that those exclusions now come with a price. Under section 108(b),
the amount that is excluded from the debtor's itcome because of insolvency
(or bankruptcy) reduces specified favorable tax attributes that the debtor
possss. 51 'I the exte nt tht e debtor's tax attributes are reduced, the
"exclusion" can be seen as a deferral rather than a pure exclusion from tax
consequence of any kind. However, to the extent tMat the debtor does not:
have sufficient favorable tax artributes to be reduced, the debtor still does
not recognize income for the excluded amount; and so that amount of the
exclusion is not a deferral but can be seen as a pure exclusion. Most provisions
cxempt ing an item trom gross income can be classified in either of these two
categories. Either they will constitute a nonrecognition provision in which
the income is deferred to a fature date, or thcy vvil constitute a pure exclusion
from income with no deferral of tax consequences. The insolvency exception
is somewhat unusual in that: it comprises both categories. It, will be a nonrec-
ognition provision to the extent that the excluded income causes a reduction
of tax attributes, and it will be a pure exclusion to the extent that it does not
reduce tax attributes.
'The statute provides a list of tax attributes to be reduced and provides at
order of priority for their reduction. "9 Except for the red-action of credits, the
redluction is made on a dollar for dollar basis so that each dolar of excluded
income reduces a dollar of tax attribute.6 Credits are reduced on a one-third
basis so that each dollar of excluded income reduces by 33.33 cents of the
relevant credit.' The order in which tax attributes are reduced is:
(0 Any net operating loss (N OL) fhr the taxable year and any car-
ryover of a NOL from a prior year are the first items reduced." Note
that catrbacks of NO s from subsequent years are not reduced. 'Ihe
reduction is made first to the NOL for the current year and then is
applied to the carryovers from prior years it the order in which they
arose.
6
'
- 108(b).
6,0 108(b)(3)(A).
K J08(b)(3)(B).6 2 10 8(b) (2) (A).
63,% 1 ( )-)
Tax Latiwyer, 'Vol. 69, 1N. I
('Af\(iL JAON OF- 1)FBlr AND REIIt 0 CDRANSA IR iONS
(2) The second item in order to be reduced is the general business
credit carryovers that are provided by section 38 from and to the year
in which the COD occurred.
(3) 'Ihe third item in order is the minimum tax credit available at
the beginning of the next taxable year under section 53(b).6
('I Ihe fourth item in order is any capital loss in the year in which
the COD occurred and any capital loss carryover to that year.' 
Note that carrybacks of capital losses from subsequent years are not
reduced. The reduction is made first to the capital loss for the current
year and then is applied to the carryovers of capital losses from prior
years in the order in which they arose. 67
(5) 'Ihe fiftth in order is the basis of property that the debtor
owns at the beginning of the next taxable year! W}'Xhen the COD
is excluded by the insolvency provision, al of the debtor's property
is subject to having its basis reduced. When the COD is excluded
under the baniruptcy provision, no reduction can be made of the
basis of property that is exempt from the reach of creditors under
the federal bankruptcy rules.6' While section 108(d)(1 0) provides a
cross reference to section 1017(c)(1) for the stated proposition that
no reduction is made in the basis of exempt property of an individual
debtor, the explicit terms of section i 017(c) (1) apply that provision
only to an exclusion of COD pursuant to the baniruptcy exclusiono7
The order of priority for the reduction of the debtor's basis in his
properties is determined by Rguliation section 1.1017-1 'there is
a limitation in section 10 , 7b)(2) on the amount of the debtor's
basis that can be reduced under this provision, and that limitation is
discussed later in this Article." The operation of the basis reduction
rules for the insolvency and bankruptcy exclusion is determined by
section 1017.
(6) 'Ihe sixth in order is any pass ive activity loss or credit carryover
ander section 469(b) from the year in which the COD occurred.72
(7) 'lte last itern is the fioreign tax credit that is carried over from
or to the taxable year in which the COD occurred7
c. Electio n to Change the Order of 7ax Adibute -Reductions. Section
108(b)(5) permits a debtor whose tax attributes are to be reduced to elect to
64 108(b)(2(B)
66 108(b)2)D)
67- 108(b)()(B),
I*..; ¢ 08-(b)(2) (E), 10 17(a).
69§ 108(d) (10), I017(c )1).
70]d.
171 ,5e e m-f'/uf Par t I1.A.4 d.72I.RC. § 469(b).
73 108(b)(2)((C).
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reduce the basis of depreciable property before reducing any other tax attri-
butes if eected, the debtor's basis fior his depreciable property will be reduced
frst. if the amount of reduction to be applied exceeds the debtor's basis in
his depreciabie propert, then the excess will reduce his tax attributes in the
normal order. The election is made on the taxable return for the taxable year
in which the discharge occurred unless an extension is granted. 74
Depreciable property has the same meaning in section 108 that it has in
section 10 17. Section 1017(b)(3)(B) defincs depreciable property as prop--
ertv of a character that is subject to an allowance for depreciation, but only if
a reduction of the basis of that iter because of an exclusion of COD would
reduce the depreciation that otherwise would have been allowable for that
iter in the next taxable period.
Section 101 7(b)(3)(E) grants the debtor an election to expand the scope of
what constitutes depreciable property to include real property that the debtor
holds for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business.
Ihbis election perm its the debtor to cxpand the items that can qualiY for the
section i08(b)(5) election to advance the reduction of basis of depreciable
property ahead of other reductions of tax attributes.
d. The Linfitation on the Anoznt of Basis Reeduction. One of the tax
attributes reduced by the excluded COD of an insolvent or banirupt debtor
is the basis of his property. Congress did not wish the imposition of a tax on
the debtor's subsequent disposition of his property to leave that debtor in a
position where he may not have enough funds available to pay his debts. If
the debtor nteeded to stll assets to have the cash to pay a debt, a reduction of
basis would increase his tax iiability on that sale and might leave him with an
inadequate amount after taxes to satist the debt. To prevent that from occur-
ring, Congress set a ceiling on the amount of basis of the taxpayer's property
that can be reduced under sections 1 08(b)(2)(E) and 1017. 71
Section 101 7(b) (2) limits the reduction of basis to be made because of an
insolvency or bankruptcy cxclusion from incorne. 77 '-.he amou-t of reduction
cannot exceed the aggregate of the debtor's basis in his assets immediately
after the discharge over the aggregate of the debtor's liabilities imirrediatelv
after the discharge. For this purpose, cash is treated as basis.
Illustration. As of March 12, Year One, Sylvia had $23,000 of cash and an
acre of unimproved land with a fair market value of $12,000. Sylvia had no
other assets. Sylvia's basis in the land was $28,000. Sylvia's only liability was
a $60,000 recourse debt that she owed to the Friendly Bank. So, Sylvia was
irsolvent in the amount of $25,000. 'ihe Bank offtred to cancer $50,000 of
Sylvia's liability in exchange for her payment to the Bank of $20,000 cash.
Sylvia accepted and made the paymento By this transaction, the Bank forgave
71§ 10S(d)( 9) gJ).
% l08(d)(5).
7I.R.C. §, 108(b)(2)(E), 1017.
7;'k3 ]017(b)(2),
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530,000 of Sylvia's debt. Because Sylvia was insolvent before the COD in the
amount of $25,000, she ex(cludes that amount ot[ her COD and is taxed on
the remaining $5,000 as ordinary income. Sylvia had sufficient tax deduc-tosthat yerthat sh~e had o axLiability for h ertioris thtyear o ta1 vfr tl e y ear,
After the transaction, Sylvia had $3,000 of cash and the unimproved land.
Her $28,000 basis in the land is to be reduced under §'1017 at the begin-
ning of the next tax year. Because $25,000 of Sylvias COD was excluded
from income, if there were no limitation on the amount of the reduction,
Sylvia's basis in the land would be reduced by that amount, and she would
have a basis of' $3,000 in the land. '"he statutory limitation prevents that
from occurring.
immediately after the COD, Sylvia has a liability of$ 10,000 outstanding.
She has a basis of $28,000 in the lot. She also has S3,000 in cash, which is
:reatcd as basis for this purpose. So, her total basis is $3 1,000. Her basis in the
land cannot be reduced by more than the difference between her aggregate
basis and her aggregate liability immediately after the COD. Her aggregate
basis is $31,000, and her aggregate liability is $10,000. Tbe difference of
$21,000 is the maximum amount of reduction that can be applied to Sylvia's
basis in the land. Her $28,000 basis in the land is red-aced by $21,000,
and Sylvia will have a basis of $7,000 in the land as of the beginning of the
next year.
As of the beginning of next year, if no other events occurred, Sylvia will
have $3,000 in cash and land with a basis of $7,000. if she were to sell the
land, there would be no tax on $7,000 of the amount realized on the sale
because that is her basis. Thus, the tax systern will not prevent Sylvia from
having the $10,000 to satisfy her liability,
An unresolved question in determining the amount of an insolvent debtor's
liability at the time of a COD and immediately afterwards is whether to
account for the debtors income tax liability that has accrued at the time of
discharge (including the tax liability for any income the debtor recognized
by becoming solvent). That issue does not arise on the facts of this problem
because Sylvia's deductions were such that she had no income tax liability Cor
that year.
'Ihe limitation on thc reduction of basis does not apply to basis reduced by
reason of an election under section 108(b) (5) to elevate depreciable property
over other tax attributes in determining the order it which they are to be
reduced. 7
e. [)e Deterrmination of the Anount of nsaoivencty Because insolvency
is defined as the excess of the fair market value of the debtor's assets over the
aggregate of his liabilities, it is necessary to determine what assets of the debtor
are included in that computation and what liabilities are aken into account.
71 1017(1b)(2)(B),
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e. 1. ExemptA'sst . The principal issue in determining the assets
to be included in t'le computalion is whether assets that are exempt by state
or federal law from the claims of creditors are to be included.7
Prior to the i 980 amendments to section 108, the Tax Court held that
assets that are exempted from the claims of creditors by state or federal law are
not taken into account in measuring a taxpayer's insolvencv.' Ih..e rationale
was that because those assets were insulated from the claims of creditors, the
discharge of the debt did not fiee those assets from restrictions. As a conse-
quence of the adoption of the amendments made in 1980, the ax Court
changed its position on this issue. 'uIe lax Court held that the 1980 codifica-
tion of the insolvenc exclusion impliedly expanded the types of assets to be
included in the calculation of insolvency, and so assets exempt fronm creditors
are to be included in the computation. It appears, therefore, that exempt
assets are to be taken in to account.
if a debtor has assets that cannot be reached by the debtor to pay his debts,
then those assets should be excluded from the computation of insolvency, inShtpherd Ciormissiontr.8 2 the question was whether to include the debtor's
interest in a pension fund in the calculation. 'lie debtor had the right to bor-
row up to 50% of his interest in the fund but otherwise could not currently
reach the fund's assets.'- "iue Tax Court held that the 50% of the fund that
the debtor could borrow was available to the debtor and thus includable in
his assets for determining his insoivency ,'lhe 50% that he could not borrow
was not available to him and thus excluded from the calculation."a
e.2. Contingent Liabilities. in order for a debtor to be permit-
ted to take a contingent liability into account in determining solvency, the
debtor must show by a preponderance of the evidence that he will be called
upon to pay the contingent obligation.' If the debtor is able to carry that
burden of proof, he can include the entire anmou [It of the contingent Iiabiiitr
in measuring his solvency, If not, none of the contingent liability is taken
into account. It is an all or nothing proposition. 1he debtor is not permit ted
to take into account a discounted figure reflecting the probabili vy that the
debtor will be called upon to make the palyment
S7
F[or a discussion of rules concerning determination of the debtor's assers. see Helen C.
Naimi, The Defi'ition oj sets U naer the ,sv'eory Exduson, 1 36 T x NOTaS (TA) 1035 (Aug.
27, 2012).
"',e, e., .-Hunt v, Comrmisso ner, 58 iTC.M. (CCH) 965, T(C..M. (P- ) ! 89,660 (1 989);
Col v. (onmssioner, 42 B.T.A. 1110, 1113 (1940).
See Carlson v. Comnissioner, I I 6I T.. 87, 104 (2001).
-
2 104T.CM. (CCH-1 108, 11i, 2012 TC.M, (RIA) 1 2012-212, at 1543.
4 da It
"Id. at 112.
'See jerkd %. Commissiorje, 92 F.3d 844, 850 (9th CH Q 990) (2-1 deisior'), aff'g 109
T.C, 463 (1997).
'' . ar 850-51.
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e.3. Jonrecourse Liabilites. A nonrecourse debt is a debt which
is secured by property of the debtor but for which the debtor has no personal
obligation to repay. hlus, if the debtor defaults, the creditor's only recourse is
to levv on the property securing the debt because the creditor cannot require
any payments from the debtor. For the purposes of the COD rules, a nonre-
course debt that is secured by a taxpayer's property is treated as a debt of the
taxpayer55 Consequently. the discharge of a nonrecourse debt by a creditor
who was not the seler of the encurribered property can cause COD income
even when the arnount of the debt is greater than the fair market value of the
property securing it.s°
in determining whether and to what extent a debtor is insolvent, should
the amount by which a nonrecourse debt: exceeds the fair market value of the
property that secures the debt (excess nonrecourse debt) be treated as a liabil-
ity of the debtor? Because the creditor cannot collect the excess nonrecourse
debt unless its security increases in value, that portion of the nonrecourse
debt has no effcct on the debtor's solvency and so, with one exception, is
ignored by the Service in determining the extent to which a debtor is solvent
or insolvent.
However, if all or a portion of the nonrecourse debt is discharged, it would
contravene the policy for the insolvency texception if the amount of the non-
recourse debt that was cancelled were ignored in determining the amount
of the debtor's insolvency. Accordingl , the Service has ruled that, while the
excess nonrecourse debt generally is ignored in determining the debtor's sol-
vency, the amount of an excess nortrecourse debt that is discharged will be
taken into account.",
lltustration 1. B owns a building with a fair market value of $300,000.
The building is subject to a nonrecourse $250,000 mortgage. B owns other
properties with an aggregate value of $80,000, and B has recourse debts total-
ing $200,000. None of B's debts is a purchase-money debt and none would
be deductible when paid. A creditor of B cancels $62,000 of B's recourse
debts for a payment of $12,000, which constitutes a cancellation of' $50,000
of indebtedness. Because the amount of B's nonrecourse debt is less than the
value of its security, it is treated as a liability for purposes of determining B's
insolvency, 'ihtrcfore., immediately before the dischargt, B was insolvent in
the anount of $70,000. Under section 108, none of the discharged debt is
income to B, but his tax attributes may be reduced.
• .RC I 108(d)(1 )( B).
"See Rev. RuaL 91-31, 1991-I C.B. 19 if thie nonrecourse debt is a purchase-moncy debt.
its canceliaion typ.caify wit] be exchjded from, O) And trea red Rs a price reduction by sec-
tion 108(e)( 5). See inla Part I LA 8.
9°See Rev. Rul. 92-53, 1992--2 C.B 48.  -e application of that position to partnerships is
exarnined it, Revenute Ruling 20t2-14, 20t2-24 JR.B. 1012. '1e latter ruling providcs that,
when the excess nonrccou'sc debt of a partnership is discharged, each partner is allocated his
share of-that discharged debr un determining whether the partner s insolvent
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Illustration 2. The same facts as in Illustration 1, except that: (i) the
amount oIf the nonrecourse debt secured by the building is $450,000, and
(2) the value of B's other assets (i.e., his assets other than the building) is
$1 80,000. 1o the extent that the nonrecourse debt exceeds the fair market
value of the building (it exceeds that value by $150,000), it is not treated as
a liability of B's for purposes of applying the insolvency exception. So, before
the discharge occurred, B's assets had a value of $480,000, and his liabilities
totaled $500,000 ($200,000 recourse debts and only $300,000 of the non--
recourse debt is counted as a liability). Because B was insolvent by $20,000
inunediately before the discharge of $50,000 of his recourse debts, $20,000
of that discharge is not included in B's income, and the remaining $30,000 is
recognized as ordinary income°
Illustration 3. The same facts as those in Illustration 2 except that in
addition to the discharge of $50,000 of the recourse debts, on the same da,
the creditor of the nonrecourse debt forgave $150,000 of that debt. After
the cancellation of $150,000 of the nonrecourse debt, the balance of that
debt ($300,000) equaled the fair market value of the building that secured
it. 'the entire amount of the notrecourse debt that was discharged was excess
nonrecourse debt. if the excess nonrecourse debt that was discharged were
riot treated as a liability of B's, the discharge of that amount wotld cause B
to recognize an additional $150,000 of ordinary income. B would have been
insolvent in the amount of only $20,000 immediately prior to the discharge
of $200,000 of debts ($50,000 recourse debts and $150,000 nonrecourse
debt), and so B would recognize $180,000 of income from those discharges.
But after the discharges were completed, the value of B's assets would exceed
the amount of his liabilities by only $30,000, and so B would have only
that amount available to pay the taxes on the COD income. That would
contravene the congressional policy foir the insolventc exclusion to limit the
amount of COD income to the amount of net asset value the debtor has
after the discharge. It would be unfair to treat the canceilation of the excess
nonrecourse debt as COD and not treat that debt as a liability of the debtor.
Accordingly, the entire $1 50,000 of excess norecourse debt that was can--
celied is treated as a liability of B's. The amount of B's insolvency immediately
prior to the discharges was $170,000, and so that amrnount of the $200,000
discharged debts is excluded from B's income. Only the remaining $30,000
of discharged debts is recogn ized as income.
e.4. Tax Liability. To what extent, if any, are the debtor's tax
liabilities that have accrued at discharge to be taken into account in deter-
mining his insolvency? To what extent are the debtor's accrued tax liabil-
ities (including the tax ort any income the debtor recognized because the
COD made him solvent) existing immediately after the discharge taken into
account in applying the limitation on basis reduction provided by section
1017(b)(2)? The amount of the debtor's tax liability will not be known until
after the end of the taxable year because it can be affected by subsequent
events in that year All of the events that will determine the amount of the tax
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liability have not occurred at the time of the discharge. Because the all events
test is not met, the debtors tax liabilities have not accru ed for tax purposes.
Nevertheless, it seems that the tax liabilities should be taken into account in
determining solvenc. lhey are liabilities that arise from evet:s occurring at
or prior to the discharge, and they can be determined at the end ofthe year.
e,5. [be Baruk;, to
, 
_Ev lucsior. '-ihe bankruptcy (Title 11)
exclusion requires the same red-action of tax attributes in the same manner as
applies to the insolvency exciusion." 1 ihe principal differenet in the opera--
tion of this exclusion from the insolvency exclusion is that the amount of
COD to be excluded for a discharge in a bankruptcy case is not Limited to the
insolvencv of the debtor. Regardless of vhether the debtor is solvent after the
debts are forgiven in a bankruptcy cast, the total amnount torgiven is excluded
from income., 2 Another difference is that the basis of property that is exempt
trom the reach of creditors under federal bankruptcw law cannot be reduced
because of the exclusion of COD under the bankruptcy exclusion,"'
'ihe bankruptcy exclusion is given priority over all of th oth r excusions 4
e.6. 7he Qllalifi'ed Real Property BIsiness Exclusion. If a debtor
(other than a C corporation) elects, the cancellation of a qualified real prop-
erty business indebtedness is excluded from income.9 The amount excluded
is subject to twvo limitations.
First, as to any single qualified real property business indebtedness (defined
beiow), the amrott excluded cannot exceed the difference between the prin-
cipal anount of that debt immediately before the discharge and the fair mar-
ket value of the realty that it secures. 1 'ihe fair market value of such reality
must first be reduced by any qualified real property business indebtedness
securing that property that is not discharged in the transaction. 97 I, other
words, the exclusion from income for the discharge of any one qualified debt
can apply only to a reduction of the excess of the amount of that debt over
the net value of the realty that secures it.
In addition to the limitation on each single qualified debt, there is an overall
limitation on the amount excludable under this provision. The total amount
excluded cannot exceed the aggregate bases of depreciable real property that
the debtor holds immediately before the discharge (other than realty acquired
in contempnlation of the discharge). 98 'ihe bases of the debtor's depreciable
realty must first be red-aced by the reductions required for the insolvency and
bankruptcy exclusions and by the reduction folr the qualified farm cxclusiort. 9
111RC. § 1017(c)(1),9'4k 10S(a)(2) (A).
95 10 (a) 1) (1)),
16§ 108(c)(2)(A)(i)
9 108(0(29)(B,.
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The amount of qualified real property business indebtedness that is excluded
under this provision will reduce the debtor's basis in his depreciable realty.100
The red-action of basis of depreciable real property is determined under the
provisions of sect ion 10 1 7.10' While section 10 17(b) (3) (E) permnits a debtor
to elect to treat real property held for sale to customers in the ordinary course
of a trade or business as depreciable property, that provision does not apply to
the real property business indebtedness exclusion.
hlhe exclusion for the torgiveness ot quatified real property business indebt-
edness is an elective provision."'- The election must be made on the debt-
or's return for the year in which the discharge occurred unless the Service
grants an extension."' The standards that the Service employs in determining
whether to grant an extension are set forth in Treasury Regulation sections
301.9100-i through 301.9100-3. In general, in addition to an automatic
extensioni gran ted in certain circumstances by Teasury Regulation section
301.9100-2, the standard for granting an exrension is that "the taxpayer acted
reasonably and in good faith and that the grant of the extension will not prej-
udice the interests of the Government.""1  One situation in which a taxpayer
is deemed to have aicted reasonably in good faith is if he relied on the advice
of a qualified tax professional whose competence he had no reason to doubt,
and the ta-c professional failed to make the election or advise the taxpayer to
do so.
10 6
'The qualified real property business ewlusion is not available to a debtor
that is a C corporation. 10
A qualified real property business indebtedness is a debt irtcurred or
assumed by the debtor in connection with real property that is used in a trade
or business and is security for that debt. It is treated as such indebtedness only
if an election is made. if the debt was assumed or incurred by the debtor after
1992, iti will not qualitl[y unless it is qualified acquisition indebtednesso ° Prior
to 1993, the debt was not required to be an acquisition indebtedness. A debt
that constitutes qualified farm indebtedness will rtot be qualified real prop-
erty business indebtedness.1 9 A qualified real property business indebtedness
includes a debt resulting from the refinancing of a qualified real property
1I.RC. ' 0c)(), 1017390(3)(F).
101 (. 08(c)(1), 017(b)(3)(F)
2 1017( (3)(F)(ii).
5 108(c)(3)(C).
"'4 108(d)(9)(A).
"'SReg, 301,91 00-3(a),
!°6R~g 301.91 00-3(b). For art cxamptc where an exrenisic) -was granted, see [PL.R. 2014-
32-009, (Apr. 211, 2014).
i97§ 108(a)(1)(D1),
1-° 108(c)(3).
I09N 108(c)(3)(C_),
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business indebtedness, but oniy to the extent that the amount of the refi-
nanced debt does not exceed the amount of the debt that was reinnanced.li
Qualified acquisition indebtedness is a debt incurred or assumed to acquire,
construct, reconstruct, or substant ially imnprove real property that is used in a
trade or business and is security for that debt. 31
'Ihe banLruptc, insolvency, and Carm exclusions are given priority over
the qualified real property business exclusion.' 12 Section 108(e)(5)() gives
the qualified rcal property busirness exclusion priority over the exclusion Cor
purchase-money debt reductions." 3
As noted above, a debt that otherwise would constitute a qualified real
properw business indebtedness will not qualify if it also constitutes quali-
fied farm indebtedness.I 14 But a qtualified farm indcbtc dncss is not excluded
from income unless the creditor who forgave the debt constitutes a "quali-
fied person" as dlefined in section 108(g)( 1)(B). 11 As literally writtern, the
statute would disqualiv for any exclusion a real property business indebt-
edness which is also a qualified farm indebtedness when thc latter debt is
not excluded from income because the creditor was not a qualified person.
'Ihtat literal language is contrary to the legislative purpose, which was merely
to give the farm exclusion priority over the qualified real property business
exclusion. it is unlikely that Congress intended to deny any exclusion for the
discharge. it seems likely that the statute will be construed to allow the exclu-
sion under the qualified real property business provision in that circumstance.
e.7. ie arm Exclusion. A discharge by a qualified person of a
qualified farm indebtedness is excluded from the debtor's income."16 Subject
to two exceptions, a qualified person is one who is actively and regularly
engaged in the business ot lending money and who is not a person related
to the debtor."' In addition, a qualified person includes any federal, state or
local government or agency or instrurnentalitv thercot "
The insolvency and bankruptcy exclusions have priority over the qualified
farmtKt exclusion, but the latter has priority over the qualified real property
business exclusion.
A debt is a qualified farm indebtedness if it is ircurred directly by the
debtor in connection with his operation of the trade or business of farming
and if at least 50% of the aggregate gross receipts of the debtor for the three
1 108 (3)(C). ifa pre- 993 qualified real property business indebtednesss that was not
a quatifled acquisiton indebtedness is refinanced after 1992, the refiinanced debt will quafiy
even though it is not a qualified acquisition debt.
5 108(0(4).
'IN 108(a)(2)(A)-(B), (c)(3),
IS'ee s-,pra Parr il],&8.11' 108(c)(3).
115 108(g(1)(9A).
jjr§ 108(a)(MC).
117 108':g)(1)(B).
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taxable years prior to the year in which the discharge occurred "is attributable
to the trade or business of tarming,"
There is a limitation on the amount that can be excluded under this pro-
vision, 'Ihe amount excluded from income cannot exceed the sum of the
adjusted tax attributes of the debtor and the aggregate bases of "qualified
property" as of the beginning of the taxable year following the year in which
the discharge occurred. 12 The adjusted tax attributes are the attributes listed
im sectiorn 108(b)(2) (i.e., those subject to reduction because of the bank-
ruptcy or insolvency exclusion) except for the basis of the debtor's property
and a rodiicat ion of the amount of credits takert irtto account.21 In calcu-
lating the amount of the adjusted tax attributes, they are first reduced by the
reductions caused by the insolvency exclusion. e" Qualified property is any
property that is used or he'd for use by the debtor in a trade or business or
for the productiort of itncome.' 'ihe basis of qualified property that can be
used for this purpose is first reduced by any reduction required because of the
application of the insolvency excl usion. 12
The amount excluded by this provision reduces the tax attributes listed in
section i08(b)(2) irt the sanmne manner as the reductions for the insolvency
and bankruptcy exclusion are applied)>5 However, the reduction of basis of
the debtor's property applies only to the basis of qualified propertW>y 'ih c
order in which the basis of qualified property is reduced is: (i) depreciable
propert, (2) land used or he'd fior use in trade or business of farmirig, and (3)
other cualified property 1 2
e.8. lPurchase-Money Debi. Prior to the Barkruptcy Act of
1980, courts held that a discharge of a debt that was incurred as part of the
purchase of property and was owed to the seller constituted a reduction of
the purchase price of the encumbered property .12S The Tax Court restricted
the doctrine to situations where the arriount of the debt was greater than the
value of the property, and only the cancellation of the excess amount of the
debt could he treated as a price reductiono 29 'Ihat limitation does rtot apply
to the provision as codified in the Code by the Bankruptcy Act of' 1980. in
12§ 108g)(3)\)
E I08(g)(3)(B). Ir would see-m the reason that the basis of property is deleted from the
list of tax atthibutes, which are part of thr limitation on the amount that can bc excluded
from income, is to restrict the limitntion's use of the basis ofproperty to the basis of "qualified
property"
!2See§ 10 8()(3)(D).5 108(h)(3)(.124€ -5 108(g)(3)(D).
i-161.R.C_ § 1017(b)(4)(A)(4),
2 1017(b)4)(A) (i).
""See, e.g., Montgomery v, Comrmissioner, 65 TE.C 511 521 (975); 1-. Coddon &
Bros, Inc. v. Commrissioner, '37 BTA. '93, 397 (1938)
1 9See cg, Mogo q/e7y, 6 5 T[, C. a- 521; L D. (idkon c i3r-s, Inc. 3 B 'A a- 398-99,
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several acquiring cases, courts held that the doctrine would be applied only
with proof that the value of the property had declined and that the seller and
the debtor had negotiated over the cancellation as a reduction of the selling
price.' 1 'ihose requirements do not: apply to the statutory adoption of the
doctrine. The result of this doctrine was to reduce the debtor's basis in the
encurnbered property and to prevent the cancellation frorn being treated as
income to the debtor. The doctrine was applied in several cases when the
creditor of the debt was not the person who sold the property 1 I but that
position is not likely to be followed now.
When the creditor and the seller of the property are the same person a
requirement for the application of the doctrine-the doctrine can be seer! as
an cxaample of the transactional approach to the COD rules. When the debtor
purchased the property, he obtained a basis that included the debt that he
owed to the seller.2 It was assumed that he would pay that debt, and so the
amount of the debt constituted part of his purchase price and was included in
his basis, When part or al of the debt is discharged, it becomes clear that hc
will not pay that amount. Because the debt was owed to the seier. a reduction
of the debt amounts to a reduction of the price paid for the property. Rather
than to treat the discharge as income to the debtor, the cancellation can be
seen as a retroactive adjustment to the price payable for the property. 'ihis is
a generous application of the transactiona approach because the additional
basis the debtor obtained may have provided him with tax benefits in the
years prior to the discharge. If the purchased property were a building, the
debtor woulid have had greater depreciation deductions in the intervening
years than if his initial basis in the building had not included the discharged
am ount of the debt.
This doctrine concerning the discharge of a purchase-money debt was
codied with some modifications in the 1980 amendment of section 108.
Section 108(e)(5) provides that the reduction of a purchase-money debt of a
solvent debtor is treated as a reduction of the property's purchase pric.' 3 A
purchase-money debt is a debt owed to the seller of the propery as part of its
purchase, it does not: refer to a debt incurred in the purchase that is owed to
someone other than the seller. The statute does not require that the property's
value be less than the outstanding debt, if the seller was the origins1l creditor,
3°,5ee Commissioner v. Cc asrwise Transportation Corp., 7/ E2d 104 ( I sr (ii. 1934). S'e
also Amphitite Corp. V. (Cormissiorer, 1 6 T.C 1 140 (1951) (Acq).
S&e, e.g., FUrcon Gold Corp. v. Commisioner. 31 B.T A. 5 19 (1934).1he Servicereecred
he holding of tha case :n Revenue Rujling 91-31, 1991-1 C.B. 19. See io Hirslhv. Commis.-
sioner, 11 5 F.2d 656 (7th ir, 1940) (COD was excluded under rhe purciase-money debt rule
where -he debt had been refinanced so rhat the creditor was nor the selter); Freedom News-
papers, Inc. v Commissioner, 34 TC..L 1755 (1977'; Brown v. (ornmissioner, 10 B TA.
1036 (1928.
""See Crane v. Conmissioner, 33'i U.S 1, '1 (1 947)
133S. RPn' No. 96-1035, at 12-13 (1980), BankruprcyTax Act of1980, Pub. L. No 96-589,
'5 108(e)(5)i 94 St 3389 3393 (1980).
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but had transferred the debt to a third party before the discharge took place,
the statutory provision will not apply. Nor will it apply when prior to the
discharge the properw was transferred by the buyer to a third person. Also,
ever if the seler is the creditor, if the cancellation occurred for reasons other
than an agreement between the buyer and the seller, such as the expiration of
the statute of Jim itations, sectiorn I08(e) (5) will not apply134
All of the other exclusions from income take priority over the purchase-
money debt: exclusion 13
The question arises as to whether the statutory provision is not exclusive so
that the cases1 36 applying the doctrine to a debt owed to a third party could be
applicable. Even if the common law on this doctrine is still viable, it is virtu-
ally certain that it will not apply to a debt owed to a third party who is not
the seller, 3 In Part VI.B. of this Article, we point out one situation in which
a cancellat ion of such a debt to a third party migt be xcluded [rom irtore,
but the prospects for prevailing on that issue are not good.
Sect ion 108(e) (5) (B) states that the purchase-mrroncy exclusiott does not
apply if te reduction occurs in a Title 1 case or when the debtor is insol-
vent 3s 'Ihe apparent purpose of thatt ewCeption is to give priority to the
inso'vency and bankruptcy exclusions so that the reduction of tax attributes
caused by those provisions will apply instead of a price reduction. However,
it appears that the exception is redundant because section 108(e)(5)(C)
apparertly grants all the other exclusions priority over the purchase-rnoney
exclusion., 3)
'fhat raises a question as to what should be the treatncnt of a cancll"i-
tion of a purchase-money debt of a debtor who was insolvent but became
solvent as a result of the cancellation. ihe i nsolvcrtcv exlusion will not apply
to the discharged debt to the extent that the debtor became solvent. Will
the amount that is not excludled by the insolvency exception be excluded by
section ]08(e)(5)? The express language of section 108(e)(5) provides that
it applies only if the purchaser is nort insolvent: when the reduction of the
debt occurred. Yet, it is one thing to give priority to the insolvency exclusion
and quite arother to cause income recognition because of a limitation on
that exclusion. It seems plausible that the purchase-money debt exclusion will
apply to the amount not ewcluded by the debtors insolvc.
Illustration 1. In Year One, Hilda purchased an apartment building. Hiida
paid $200,000 cash anrd took the building subject to an $800,000 mortgage.
IHilda's initial basis in the building was $1,000,000. In Year Six, the mort-
gageeagrced to cancel $200,000 ol the mortgage debt irt exchange for Hilda's
"'S. Rxo, No. 96-1035, at 1-17 (1980).
S{kirsch v, Cornrnssioter, 11 5 -.2d 656 (7h Cr. 1940); Fulton Gold Corp. V. Cormmis-
,ioner, 31 B.T.A. 119 (1934).
i 17See, e.g., Presi'ar v Conmissioncr, 167 F3d 1323 (1 OrC (-ir. 1999).
138See id.
139.5 108(e)(5)(B).
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payment of $50,000, and that took place. immediately before the discharge
took place, the adjusted basis of the building was $800,000; and thc out-
standing balance of the mortgage was S700,000. h e mortgagee was not the
person who sold the property to Hilda, Hilda was solvent when the discharge
took place. Section 108(e)(5) does not apply to the discharge, and Hilda will
have $150,000 of income unless some other exclusion applies (such as the
qualified real property business exclusion)J. 4 )
Illustration 2. In Year One, Frank purchased an office building from Alice.
Frank paid Alice $200,000 cash and took the property subject to a $800,000
non recourse debt that is owing to Alice. Thus, Alice loaned Frank $800,000
to finance his purchase of the property. In Year Six, Alice cancelled $200,000
of the non recourse debt in exchange Cro Frank's payment of $50,000. Frank
was solvent when the discharge took place. Immediately before the discharge
took place, Frank's adjusted basis in the property was $800,000, the out-
standing balance of the nonrecourse debt was $700,000. The property had a
value of $900,000 at that time° Section 108(c)(5) precludes any recognition
of income by Frank on the cancellation of the debt. instead, Frank's basis in
the building is reduced by the $150,000 discharge to $650,000 'Ihe fact the
propert had a value that was greater than the amount of the outstanding
debt does not prevent the application of section 108(e)(5).
Illustration 3. The same facts as those stated in Illustration 2, except
that, immediately before the discharge took place, Frank was insolvent in
the amount of $100,000. As a result of the discharge, Frank became solvent
in the amount of $50,000. So, of the $150,000 debt that was discharged,
$1 00,000 is excluded from Frank's income by the insolvency exclusion; that
amount will reduce Frank's tax attributes. lihe remaining $50,000 of the dis-
charged debt is not excluded by the insolvency provision. Can that $50,000
of discharged debt be cxcluded by section 108(e)(5)? While the literal lan-
guage of that provision would seem to prevent its application, the question
is unresolved,
e.9. Discharge of Ia Deductible Liability. Section i 08(e)(2) pro-
vides that the discharge of a debt that would have been deductible when paid
is excluded from the debtor's income. 4 The genesis of this statutory rule is
a 1977 '1',x Court decision involving the meaning of the word "liabilitv" in
the application of a corporate tax statute." 2 in Eocht, the Tax Court held that
liability in that statute did riot include an obligation to make a payment that
would be deductible when paid.' 43 Congress codified this holding in 1978
'43Note that if thc qualifcd real properiy busiless exclusion we dcctcd, it would have
taken prioriy over rhe purchase-money debt exclusion even if the latrer had otherwise appled,Sece . 08 (e) (5) (C),
108(C)(2).
"lohit v. Commrnissioner, 68 T. 223 (197) (rev ewd by dhe couri" . c corporate tax
statute at issu was sectioni 357(c).
"Jt;cii, 68 TIC. ar 238.
la~x Lawyri Vol 69, No. 1
SECTION OF TAXATION
with Code sections 357(c)(3) and 358(d)(2), 1 4 The same concept has been
adopted in the partnership tax area by administrative ruling and in the COD
area through section 108(e)(2).
A question can arise as to the meaning of the st:a tory requirement that
the "payment of the liability would have given rise to a deduction." Typicaly,
there will not be a problem in applying section 1 08(e)(:2) because either the
liability would be a nonitemized deduction when it was paid or the debtor is
a corporation. But what il the debtor is an individual and the payment of the
liability would have been an itemized deduction? in our view, all the statute
requires is that a payment of the liability would come within a provision for
a deduction, regardless of whether it would be fully deductible in specific
circumstances. A contrary construction would be too difficult to administer.
The question is unresolved.
'Ihe Focht case arose in the context ol a transf'er of assets and liabilities by
a cash method taxpayer to a corporation in which the nonrecognition provi-
sion of section 351(a) generally prevents income recognition. Some of the
liabilities were accounts payable that would be deductible expenses when paid
by the cash method taxpayer.' 45 it was the transferee corporation's assumption
of those liabilities that the Tax Court held did not cause income to the tax-
payer. '47 But what is the tax treatment to the transferee of the liabilities when
the transferee pays them?
One might expect that the transferee who receives a deductibte liability as
part of a parchase of assets would not be permitted to take a deduction for the
payment: of that I iability: 'lhe acceptance of the liability would be part of the
purchase price, and so the payment of that liability would be pursuant to the
purchase of the assets and t reated as a capital expenditure. But in the context
of a transfer to a controlled corporation as part of an exchange that is granted
nonrecognition by section 351 (a), it was determined that the purposes of
that nonrecognition provision would be frustrated if the transferee were noU
permit ted to deduct the payments. Accordimgly, the Service has ruled that the
transferee can deduct the payment of the liabilities./4s
Permission for a transferee of a deductible liabiity to deduct its payment
should be restricted to circumstances where that treatment accords with the
144Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 365, 92 Satir 2763 (codified as ar'endcd at
I. §. 357(c)(3), 358(d)(2)).
Se'e ac,%, 68 EC. at 226,
!16S&e id at 229.
iS ee id. at 237-38.
14'Rcv, Rut, 80-198, 1980-2 CB. 113. Seealo Rev. RuL 95-74, 1995-2 C.B. 36 (affirming
Revenue Rutuig 80.-198).
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legislative purpose of a specific provision such as section 351 exchanges. In
more ordinary circumsrtances, th ctransterec will not be allowed ad duction.14)
e, 10. Purchase ofDebt by a Person Rlated to te Debtor. Section
108(c)(4) treats an acquisition of a debt b a person who is related to the
debtor as if it were an acquisition by the debtor himself Consequently, the
acquisition can give rise to COD income if the price paid is less than the
amount owing on the debt. The statute defines who constitutes a related
person for this purpose. Related persons include: (1) an individual and the
spouse, children, grandchildren, and parents of the individual (and spouses of
the individual's children and grandchildren); (2) an individual and a corpora-
tion in which the individual owns more than 50% of the value of the stock;
and (3) a grantor or beneficiary of a trust and the fiduciary of that trust. 150
The section 108(e)(4) mandate for a constructive purchase of the debt by
the debtor does not: appliy whetn the related party puIrchases the debt from a
person who also is related to the debtor."'
'ihe obvious purpose of this provision is to prevent a debtor from circum<-
venting the discharge of indebtedness rules by having his debt acquired by a
person who is closely rclated to hitri. While the debtor remains liable tor the
repayment of the entire debt, the excess of the debt over what was paid for it
may represent a gift from the debtor to the related person or a contribution
to its capital. Alternatively, the related person may simply never collect the
debt and never cancel it,
The related person vho acquired the debt is referred to herein as the " holder."
Although the transaction is treatted as if the debtor acquired the debt, the debt
is still outstanding in the hands of the holder. How is that outstanding debt to
be treated? ihe treatment is described in ITeasury Regulation section 1.108-
2. In general, the outstanding debt is treated as cancelled in exchange for a
new debt from the debtor to the holder. 'Ihe new debt is treated as having
been issued for a price equal to the basis that the holder has in the debt if
the holder acquired the debt by purchase on or less thart six months prior to
the "acquisition date." The acquisition date is described below. If the holder
did not acquire the debt by purchase on or within that six-month period, the
issue price is equal to the fair market value of the debt at the acquisition date.
Il the principal amount of the debt: exceeds the constructive issue price so that
the debtor has COD, the excess is treated as original issue discount (OID)
regardless of whether the COD is excluded from the debtor's income under
1Coniare David R. V/ebb Co. v. Comrnissioner, 77 TC. t1134 (1981), art "08 E d
1254 (7th ir. 1983) (denying a deduction in such R case), with Comrnmerca Sec. Bank v
Cornnissonet. '77 T.C. 145 (1981) (allowing varsWee who assumed a debt ro deduct is
payment). 11n0 latter d cision is questionable because the liabiily was assumed as part of the
purchase price of assets and shou d have been capitalized,
15I R.C. § 108(c)(4)(B). That is an incornpleIte lst or who constities a rdatcd person.
"j Reg, § 1108-2(b).
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section i08(a).' 52 The OID may be deductible by the debtor and included in
the holder's income under sections 163 and 1272.
Waen a debt is acquired by a person related to the debtor, that is a "direct
acquisition," A direct acquIsition occurs on the date that the debt is acquired
by the holder. But what if' the holder acquired the debt when he was not
related to the debtor and became related subsequently? If the holder acquired
the debt in anticipation of becoming related to the debtor, that is covered by
the statute and is referred to as an "indirect acquisition." An indirect acquisi-
tion occurs on the date that the holder becomes related to the debtor. The
"acquisiton date" is the date on which eithcr a direct or anr indirect acquisi-
tion occurs.,
iche regulations provide crieria for determining whether a person acquired
a debt in anticipation of becoming related to the debtor."' if the holder
acquired the debt: within six months prior to becoming rdated, he is trated
as having acquired the debt in anticipation of becoming related to the debt-
or, Otherwise, the deterniation is made on the basis of the tacts and
circumstances that are present.6 If the holder acquired the debt more than
six months belore the holder becarre related but within 241 months, hc is
required to make certain disclosures on an attachment to his tax return.157 in
addition to other penalties, a failure to disclose will create a presumption that
the holder acquired the debt in anticipation of becoming related to the debt-
or. ) s h'is presumption can be rebutted by presenting facts and circurrstances
that cearly establish the holder did nor anticipate a relationship.
'1he treatment in sectior 108(e)( 4 ) ofa related person's purchase ot a debt-
or's debt does not apply to a direct or indirect acquisition of a debt with a
stated maturity date riot greater than one year after the acquisition date, pro-
vided that the debt is actual4y retired on or before its maturity date."'
e. i. Student Loans. "Ie discharge ot ccrtain student loans will
not cause the debtor to recognize income if the discharge is pursuant to a pro-
vision in the loan agreement that all or a portion of the debt will be cancelled
if the student worked for a specified period of time in certain professions for
a broad class of employers, 1 'To quality, the purpose of the loan must be to
assist the student in attending a qualified educational institution, and the
lender must be an entity that is one of those listed in sectior 108(f)(2). 6'I 'Ibhe
","Rqg. § 1.108-2(W,,(1,
P5Reg. § J 2()SS'Reg§ L 110,q-2(c),
151 Reg. 1.I08--2(c)(3).
5. Reg. 1.108--2(c)(2),
'57Reg. L i,108-2(c)(4) (noting, also, tha there Lrc other circumst nces in which dio-
sure is required),
PReg 5 110-2(c)(2), (4)
sR5g. 5 1.108-2(e).
icILRC. 108().
"'For exarnple, the ioan must be made by annong others, the government, a pubic benefit
corporation 'r anq educaitioa organization. 108(f)'2),
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exclusion does not apply if the student is required to perform services for the
same educational institutioni making the loan to the student. 10
The 2004 American Jobs Creation Act added subsection (f)(4) to section
108, and the Affordable Care Act of 2010 cxpanded that subsection. 'ihc
subsection excludes from income amounts received ander specified federal
and state loan forgiveness or repaynient programs designed to increase hcaith
care services in underserved areas.
e. 12. /ffect on the (_,'zditor. A creditor may have tax conse--
quences when it cancels a debt. For example, the creditor may be entitled to
a bad debt deduction, have made a gift for which a gift tax return is required,
or have paid a dividend to the debtor or made a contribution to the debtor's
capital. if the creditor is a certain financial entity or government: unit, and if
the amount discharged is $600 or more, the creditor may be required by sec-
tion 6050P to file a return disclosing certain informration+
if both principal and interest were owing on a debt that was partialy dis-
charged, the creditor and the debtor are permitted to determine by their
agreement how much of the discharged debt was principal and how much
was interest, 6'ihre tax treatment ofa creditor when a corporate debtor trans-
fers its stock in exchange for a cancellation of its debt, or a partnership trans-
fcrs an interest in that partnership in exchange for- a cancellation of its debt,
is discussed in Part III.C. of this Article.
e 13. Recapture of O0edina ny hncome. As noted, COD income
is recognized as ordinary income. An exclusion of' COD income causes a
reduction of tax attributes, Nwhich constitutes a kind of deferra of the tax con--
sequence of the COD. if the tax attribute that is reduced is a net operating
loss or a tax credit, the deferred tax consequence will be of the same character
as the excluded income. ' " On the other hand, if the tax attribute reduced is
a net capital loss carryover, it will not: be of the ordinary income character of
the excluded COD income. The current tax law does nothing to prevent the
change of character from occurring in that circuristance.
The same change of character might occur if the tax attribute reduced is the
basis of property. 'the reduction of basis of depreciable property will cause a
loss of ordinary deductions, and so the character of the deferral will be con-
sistent with the xcluded income, However, if the property whose basis was
reduced is sold or exchanged, the gain (or part of the Rain) recognized might
be a capital gain or a section 1231 gain. 'Ihe Code addresses that situation
by requiring that the gain on a disposition of the property attributable to the
reduction of basis be treated as ordinary inconnc and thereby correlated with
the COD gain that was excluded from income. This is accomplished by uri-
lizing the recapture of depreciation rules applied by section 12/5
5'cSe Estate of Hager ,( ornmissiorner, 28 TCM. (C(14) 341, 345-46, T C.M, (P-H)
69,059 (1969).i' 61.R.(_:, .% 61(a)(12), 1221.
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Section 1017(d) provides that any property whose basis is reduced under
that section and that is neither section 1 245 property nor section 1250 prop-
erty will be treated as section 1245 property Moreover, any reduction of'
basis in that property under section 1017 will be treated as a deduction that
was allowed for depreciation. As a consequence, the amount of the reduction
of basis for the COD income will be recaptured as ordinary income to the
extent of gain recognized on the property disposition.
Illustration, In Year One, Paula had $10,000 of COD, all of which was
excluded from her income because she was insolvent. The only tax attribute
that Paul'a had was her $60,000 of basis in stock of thc X cororrtiort Although
Paula was still insolvent immediately after the discharge, her basis in her X
stock exceeded her aggregate liabilities by more than $10,000. Consecquendy,
the limitation on the reduction of basis in section 1017(b)(2) was inappli-
cable. As a consequence of th exclusion of the COD income, Paula's basis in
her X stock was reduced to $50,000 at the beginning of Year Two.
in Year Six, Paula sold her X stock for $80,000, which was its value. Paulds
basis in the X stock was still S50,000, so she recognized a gain of $30,000.
IF the exclusion from income of the COD had noot taken place, the X stock
would be a capital asset, and Paula would have recognized a long-term capital
gain of $20,000. Instead, because of section 1017(d), Paulia must treat the
stock as section 1245 property, and she must treat the $10,000 reduction
in basis as depreciation deductions that were allowed. As a result, Paula will
recognize ordinary income of $10,000, and she will have a long-term capital
gain of $20,000,
B, S Corporations and Partnerships
1. S Corporations
Section 108(d)(7)(A) states that the determination of the applicability of
the exclusions for insolvency, bankruptcy, qualified farn indebtedness, and
qualified real property business indebtedness for the COD of an S corpora-
tion is made at the corporate level and not at the shareholder level. Also, it is
the tax attributes of the S corporation that are reduced because of any exclu-
sion.! 5 As a consequence of a 2002 amendment of that statutory provision,
the COD excluded from the S corporation's income is not passed through to
its shareholders and so does not increase the basis of their stock under sec-
tion 1366(a).,6 6 That 2002 amendment overturned the 2001 decision of the
Suprerne Court in Gittz that allowed the shareholdcrs to increase their stock
basis by their share of the excluded incone.
1 67
'lie S corporation's income, loss, deduct ions, and credits for the tax--
able year pass through to it shareholders under section 136 6a) befre an'
' 108(d)(7)(A),; Reg, § 1,108-7(d)(1 ),
16 See Preamble to TD, 9469, 2009-48 CB 687.
1.7_,.itz -, (omissioner, 531 US. 206 (2001).
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reduction of those tax items is made as a consequence of the exclusion of the
Corporation's COD 168
Under section 1366(d)(i), when an S corporation has a loss in a taxable
year that passes through to its shareholders, a shareholder can deduct the
loss that passed through to him only to the extent that he has a basis in the
corporation's stock or in a debt: owed to him from the corporation. 6 9 Any
nondeductible losses can be carried forward to subsequent years 1 700 If an S
corporation has excluded COD in a taxable year, that can cause the termina-
tion of some of' the losses that had passed through to the shareholders but
which the shareholders have to carry torward because of their lack of basis in
the corporation's stock or debt. The manner in which the C ode does this is
described below,.
if, in the taxable year in which an S corporation had COD excluded from
income under section 108(a), other than by the real property business ewlu-
sion, a shareholder had a loss that passed through from the corporation (either
in that year or as a carryover from a prior year), and it the shareholder was pre--
vented from deducting all or any part of that loss because of his lack of basis
in stock or debt o the corporation, the shareholder's disallowed deduction
for that loss is treated as a net operating loss (NOL) of the S corporation for
purposes otdetermining the corporation's tax attributes that are to be reduced
because of the exclusion of the COD from income."" The constructive net
operating loss (NOL) of the corporation is then reduced by the excluded
COD, except it is not reduced by COD that is excluded under the real prop-
erty business excl Ision. 172 If the constructive N OL of the corporation exceeds
the amount of' reduction, then the amount of the remaining constructive
NOT. is allocated among the shareholders. Each shareholder's portion of
the remaining constructive NOL is a fraction: the amount by which that
shareholder's disallowed loss exceeds the arriount of the COD income that
would have been allocated to him if not excluded from income, over the total
remaining constructive NOL. 73 Ihe loss allocated back to a shareholder is
characterized in proportion to the character of that shareholder's losses that
!61 1- Preamble i TiD. 9469, 2009-48 C. B. 687
le basis requirernent is only one of the limit;tions on the deductibility of a pass-through
loss. In addition, the at-ris-k riles of section 465 and the passive Rci vity loss limitation ofsec.-
tion 469 apply,
.R.C., 1366(d)(2),
s' . .108(d)(7)(B).
2 8(d)((B) "he only tax attribte that is reduced because of thr real property
business exc, sion is the basis of' depreciable property. § 108(c)(1 ) So, that exc:uson does not
reduce the corporation's NOL
'k"Reg, § 1108-7(e), Ex (5),
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were changed to an NOL of the S corporation. 4 The following illustration is
drawn from an example in the regulations 175
Illustration. A, B, and C are equal shareholders of X, an S corporation.
As of the end of Year One, none of the shareholders has any basis in his X
stock, and X has no indebtedness to any of its shareholders. in Year One, X
cxcludes $45,000 of COD from its incorne under section 108(a) 176 Had it
not been excluded, $15,000 of the COD income would have been allocated
to each shareholder. In that same year, X had $30,000 of tosses, allocated
equally among its three shareholders. A has a loss of $10,000 allocated to
him. B has $10,000 ofloss allocated to him, and B also has $20,000 olpass-
through losses from prior years that were disallowed and carried over to Year
One by section 1366(d). C has $10,000 ol loss allocated to hiim, and C also
has a carryover of $30,000 of pass-through losses fi-om prior years. All of the
shareholders' losses are nondeductible because of section 1366(d) ---because
they have no basis in their X stock and no corporate debt is owing to them.
'Ihe total loss that is disallowed is $80,000 ($10,000 for A, $30,000 for B,
and $40,000 for C). That $80,000 of'total loss is treated as an NOL of X for
purposes of applying the reduction of tax attributes rule.
X's $45,000 of excluded COD income reduces its $80,000 of constructive
NOL to $35,000. t1he remaining $35,000 of NOL. is allocated back to the
shareholders in proportion to the amount by which their nondeductible loss
cxcceded the amount: of COD that would have been allocated to them if the
exclusion fiom income had not applied. So, none of the remaining NOL is
allocated to A because his $10,000 disallowed loss is less than his share of
the COD that would have been allocated to him ($15,000). B's S30,000 of
disallowed loss exceeds his share of COD income by $15,000. C's $40,000
of disallowed loss exceeds his share of' COD income by $25,000. So, 15/40
or 3/8 of the remaining $35,000 of X's NOL is allocated to B, who thereby
has a loss of $13,125 allocated to him. C has allocated to him 25/40 or
5/8 of the $35,000 of X's remaining NOL , and so C has $21,875 of loss
allocated to him. The character of the losses allocated to B and C is deter-
rnined by the proportion of the character of the disallowed losses that each
had before the reduction.1 7' B and C carry over the losses allocated to them
to subsequent years.
Only the losses passed through to shareholders that are not deductible
because of a lack of basis in stockI or debt are subjected to the above trcat--
ment. If a shareholder was denied a deduction for a pass-through loss because
"'Reg. -i.108-7(e), Ex. (5). ]Thus, if 1/6 ofa shar,-holders loss was a long.e-m capital loss,
1/2 was an ordinary loss, ar.d 1/3 was a section 1231 loss, then those fractions oftie remaining
constructive NO] thar is allocated to that shareholder wilx have the sanme character. hat is, 1/6
will be long-term capital loss, 1/2 will be an ordinray loss, and 1/3 will be a scrtion 1231 loss,
i'Sce Reg. 1.108- 7(), Ex. (5).
"[e applicable exclusion in this problem was not the qualificd real property busincss debt
ex §1(sion.
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of some other provision such as the at risk rules 17 or the passive activity
loss linitation rules, 179 those losses will not be treated as an NOL oT the
corporation.,
If ont of the shareholders in the Ilustration above had transfe rred all of
his stock before the end of Year One, his disallowed losses for that year would
still be treated as NOL of thc corporation.si in that case, X corporations
remaining constructie NOL that otherwise would have been allocated to
that terminating shareholder will be perrnantently disallowed unless the stock
was transferred to the spouse of the terminating shareholder, ' if the transfer
of the stock wais mtde to the terminating sharcholder's spouse iri a transatction
that qualified under section 1041 (a), the constructive NOL that would have
been allocated to the termiinatirig shareholder will be allocated to the spousc
in the next taxable year. 3
if a C corporation with nt t operating losses becomes anl S corporation, the
NOLs incurred while it was a C corporation cannot be carried over to years
when it is an S corporatioro,' Also, capital losses and business credits of a C
corporation cannot be carried over to years in which it is an S corporation,."
Consequenly, the S corporationI's tax attributes that are reduced by excl ded
COD income do not include items incurred when the corporation was a
C corporation.
2. Parnerships
The exclusionary rules for the cancellation of a debt of a partnership are
determined at the partner level. "ihe partnership's COD is atllocated anong
the partners. Each partner determines whether the share of COD allocated
to hiim is excluded from income. For cxamplt, the insolvency exclusion is
applied only to a partner insolvent in his own regard. If the cancelled debt
was a qualified real property business debt, tach partner can elect whetner
to exclude his share of that COD. The determination of whether the debt
constitutes a. qualified real property business debt is made at the partnership
level. Each partner who excludes any of the COD allocated to him reduces
his own tax) attributes. !87
A cancellation of a partnership's debt will reduce the partnership's liabil-
it. Section 752(b) will cause the partners to be treated as having received
a cash distribution from the partnership for their share of the red-action of
S. 465
0191.R.C . 469.
',Se Premble to T,0 9,169, 200948 ,B, 687.
"Rcg. ' 1.108-7 (d)(1).
""Reg, 1,1087 (d)(2)(i see aas Reg, 15 ,1366-2(W(5),
So3,5e Reg. ¢§ 1.108 -7(d)(2)(iii), Reg. 11 366-2(a)(5). See aso I.R.C,( I 366(d)(2)(B).
! ].R.(C.. 1371(b)(I).
"S'e Preainble ro TD 9469, 2009-48 C B 687.
!161 R.C. § 108(d)(6).
WS 108Id)(6).
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the partnership's liability. That constructive cash distribution will reduce each
partner's basis in his partnership interest."' At the same time, the allocation
of the COD income to each partner will increase his basis in his partner-
ship interest regardless of whether the COD is excJuded from his taxable
income.'" However, if the COD is excluded from a partners income by sec-
tion 108, that will usually cause a reduction of the partners tax attributes,
which could result in a reduction of his basis in his partnership interest.
Illustration. Alex) and Betty are equal partners of the AB partnership, 'iey
each have a substantial basis in their partnership interest. in Year One, the
AB partnership has a recourse debt of $20,000 cancelled, and the cancella-
tion constitutes COD income. While AB is insolvent, that has no effect on
the characterization of the COD or its tax treattrrent, Of the COD itncome,
$ i0,000 is allocated to Alex and $10,000 to Betty. Both Alex and Betty will
increase their basis in their partnership interests by $10,000
Alex is insolvent in the amount of $15,000, and so he excludes the $10,000
COD from his incorre under the insolvency exclusion. 'Ihfe exclusion of the
COD from Alex's taxable income does not prevent the increase in his basis
in his partersip interest. ihe cancellation of the $20,000 recourse debt
reduced Alex's share of the partnership's liabilities by $10,000, and so that
caused a constructive distribution to Alex of that amount. '-Ihe constructive
distribution of $10,000 cash reduced Alex's basis in his partnership interest
by that amount. Because Alex had the same share of the partnerships liability
as he did of the COD, the resulting increase and decrease of his basis in his
partnership interest is a wash° However, because of the insolvency exclusion,
Alex must reduce his tax attributes listed in section 108(b)(2). Depending
upon what attributes Altx ossesses, he might have to reduce his basis in his
partnership interest.
Because Betty is solvettt, she must inctiude her $10,000 share of the COD
in her taxable income. It does not matter that the AB partnership is insolvent.
Betty will increase her basis in her partnership interest by $10,000 because of
the COD income allocated to her. The reduction of the partnership's liability
will cause a constructive distribution of $10,000 cash to Bett, which will
reduce her basis in her partnership interest by that amount. e net result is
that Betty will recognize $10,000 of incormie, and her basis in her partnership
interest will be unchanged.
1 S1.R.C, .705(a)(2), 73301).
70 '''5(a,(1). 11T' lX Court and the Sixth Circuit hcld in Babin v. (.,mmssioer, 23 .3d
103 2 (6th (Jr, 1994), ,,f 64 TX -.M. 1357 1 9921), rha the allocation of COD to a partner
who excluded the iter from irncomc under the insolvercy exclusion could not increase his
basis in his partnership interest. ihose cases involved the 1978 tax year, which preceded the
amendrents made to secion 108 by the Bankruprcy Tax Act of 1980. In T[AAM. 1997-39-
0(02 (May 19, 1997), the Service determined that the Bahin decisions do not apply to years
subsequent to the adoption of rhe 1980 Act, Tice Service concluded that a partner's basis in
bi partnership inicrest is increased by the patrner's share of COD even wben the COD is
exciluded from the partner's taxable income,
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A person whose tax attributes are to be reduced because of an exclusion ofCOD from income is permited to treat as depreciable property his interest:
in a partnership that holds depreciable property, but only to the extent of his
proportionate interest in the partnershtip's depreciable property: 9 'Ihis provi-
sion applies only if the partnership agrees to reduce its basis in its de-reciable
property with respect to that partner,"' 'Ihe same treatment is available foir a
parent corporations stock in its subsidiary that holds depreciable propertx it
the two corporations are part of an affiliated group.
9?
C. rquityf/or Debt Exchange
1. Corporate Stock
if a corporation transfers its stock to a creditor in satisfaction of a recourse
or non recourse debt, the corporation is treated as having paid the creditor an
amount of money equal to the fair market value of the stock plus any other
property transfrred by the corporate debtor19 It' the principal amount of
the debt is greater than the amount paid by the corporation, the difference
constitutes COD.""4 While a corporation does not recognize incone on a
disposition of its stock,"9 it can recognize income from a COD unless one
of the exclusions applies. if the creditor is also a shareholder of the corpora-
rion, section i08(e)() will apply; that provision is discussed in Part IPJB. of
this Article.
if the exchange of stock for debt takes place in the context of a corporate
reorganization as defined in section 368(a), and if the debt qtualifies as a secu--
rity, the creditor will not recognize income on the exchange except for stock
it receives in payment: of accrued interest. i' In the case of a corporate reorga-
nization, the creditor's basis in the stock received for the debt will equal the
basis that the creditor had in the debt. 1
7
If the debt was not a security or if the exchange was not made pursuant to
a reorganization, the creditor can recognize gain or loss depending upon the
creditor's basis in the debt, 9 Prior to the adoption of section 1271 in '984,
a gain or loss that was recognized by a creditor on the satisfaction of a debt
usually would be ordinary income or loss because there would not have been
a sale or exchange, As a result of the adoption of sect ion 1271, a gain or loss
9'I.R.C, § 1017(b)(3)().
" 1017(b)(3)(C).
11N 1017(b)(Q3)(D)
1. R.(_C., 10 8 (c)(8).
95R.C. 103 2.
9iJ RC. 3 54(a).
1I RC. § 358(a).
1 11.R.(_- 1271.
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is more likely to be a capital gain or loss, but there are circumstances in which
a gain can be ordinary,"
A creditor who receives stock in cancelation of a debt may have previ-
ously treated the debt as partially worthless and taken a bad debt deductio
under section 16 6(a) (2). instead, a creditor might previously have treated the
debt as completely worthless and taken a bad debt deduction under section
166(a)(i). Also, the creditor might recognize a loss on the exchange if it is a
taxable transaction. Section 108(e)(7) provides that, when a creditor receives
stock of a corporation in satisfaction of that corporation's debt, regardless of
w.hether the debtor corporation is solvent, insolvent or in bankruptc, the
stock acquired by the debtor is treated as section 1245 property. It does not
matter whether the stock was received by the debtor as part of a norecogni-
tion or a taxable transaction. The statute further provides that the aggregate
amount of bad debt deductions taken by the creditor on the debt and any
ordinay loss recognized by the creditor on the exchange is treated as amounts
allowed as depreciation deductions in applying section 124 5 to a subsequent
disposition of the stock. In this regard, one car see how a debtor could recog-
nize a loss on such an exchange, but there are not likely to be many circurmn-
stances in which the loss is ordinary. If the creditor recognized a gain on the
exchange, the amount treated as depreciation deductions is reduced by the
amount of that gain."' The purpose of this provision is to require the creditor
to recognize ordinary income on a disposition of the stock to the cxtent of
any ordinary deductions the creditor obtained through a claim of a bad debt
or on a loss recognized on the exchange of' the debt. If an accrual method
creditor never took a bad deduction nor recognized an ordinary loss on the
exchange, the characterization of the stock as section 1 245 property will have
no tax significance.
in the case of a creditor who reports his income on the cash method,
any amount that was no- included in the creditor's income but that would
have been included if the debt had been satisfied in full will be added to the
amount treated as allowed depreciation deductions. '"
If the creditor subsequently exchanges the stock in a nonrecognition trans-
action, such as in a corporate reorganization, that will not trigger ordinary
income, but the potential for recognizing ordinary income will apply to a
disposition of the newy acquired property>2
If a corporation's debt is held by its shareholders in the sai proportion
that they hold its stock, and if the stock distributed in cancellation of all or
part of that debt is distributed pro rata among the corporation's shareholders,
i99For example, if' the creditor had previously taken a bad debt deduction for a partially
worthless bnsiness bad debt, R gain recognrized by the creditor on -he subseqie-o satisfacnon of
the debt would be ordinary income ro the extent of the ordinary deduCtio taker, or, the bad
debt. See Mercts. Nat'1 Bank v. Commisioner, 199 E2d 657 (trh Cir. 1952).
°°ILR,(;. 108(e)(7)(A) .
201 108('O)(7)(B"
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there is a question as to whether section 108(e)(8) applies. We believe that in
such a case, thb transact ion should be treated as a stock dividend to the share-
holders and a canceflation of the corporations debt. If so, the stock dividend
typically will be excluded from the shareholder's income by sect ion 305, and
the cancellation of the debt will be treated in the manner provided by section
1081(e)( 6 ), which provision is discussed in Part lVBo of this Article
If a creditor holds convertible debt of the corporation, there is a question
whether the e'etcise of that conversion privilege is subject to section 108(e)
(8). We believe that it is not subject to that provision and that no income or
loss is recognied°
2° Parnership Interest
The Service is to issue regulations that will apply the same treatment
described above for a transfer by a debtor corporation of its stock in satis-
faction of its debt to a debtor partnership that transfers an interest in the
partnership to a creditor in satistaction of its debt. However, heire are sorue
dif'erent tax consequences when a partnership interest is transferred.
'The partnership interest transfcrred could be either a capital interest or a
profits interest. If certain conditions are met, the fair market value of the part-
nership interest will be its liquidation VJue .203 If the partnership interest is a
profits interest, and if liquidation value is used, the partnership interest will
have a value oC zero. A zero VJue will cause the debtor partmership to have
COD income for the entire amount of the cancelled debt.
Generaliy, the creditor wifl not: recognize income or loss on transferring the
debt for a partnership interest. 4 The creditor can recognize gain or loss on
that: part of a paymrrent made in satisfaction of unpaid interest or ren.
IV. Gifts and Contributions to Capital
A. Gifis
If a creditor forgives a debt as a gift to the debtor, the COD is excluded
from the debtor's income by section 102.05 For taK purposes, a gift is a trans--
fer made out of detached and disinterested generosit.6 In a 1943 decision,
the Supreme Court: held that when a creditor cancelled a deht in order to
coflect the naximun amount that appeared feasible, the transaction could
qualify as a gif. t SiK years later, the Supreme Court repudiated that view
and held that a COD under such circumstances can cause the debtor to rec-
ognize income. 2-t s Since that time, a canceflation of a debt in a commercial
2°3Reg. § 1.108-8(b)(2)(i).
2°4.R. , 7 2 (a),
205T.R.C, 1022°6mmissione.r V f)ubersern, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (190) (quoing 0 ommisionr v.
LoBue, 351 US, 243, 246 (1956))
2°7Hdvcring v. km. Drtal Co., 3i8 U.S. 322, 331 (1943).
(_ommnissito.er v. Jacobson, 336 US. 28, 51-52 (1949).
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setting is virtually certain not to be treated as a gift. in a noncommercial
setting, such as a cance.latton by a relative of the debtor, it: is possible for the
COD to be a gift." If the amount of the gift is large enough, there could be
gift tax consequences."' °
If a debtor takes a deduction for an unpaid accrued debt, which is subse-
quently carcelled by the creditor as a git, should the debtor recognize itcome
in order to recapture the prior deduction? We discuss this issue in Part V deal-
ing With the tax betiefit rule.
B, Contribution to a (.'orpo~rwioni (i'apital
A shareholder's contribution to the corporation in which he holds stock
can be excluded from income by section 118(a). 'Ihe contribution clearly
is not a gift, but the statutory exclusion from income bears some similar-
ity to the exclusion of gifts from ircome. One might expect then that if a
shareholder forgives a debt of the corporation, that would be excluded from
the corporatiot's income as a cont ribution to its capital, However, the actual
treatment is more complicated.
'Ihe situation arose in which a corporation on the accrual method had
accrued and deducted interest on a debt to a cash method shareholder. The
shareholder did not take into incomie the accrued but unpaid interest because
of the shareholder's method of accounting. in a subsequent year, the share-
holder forgave the debt, '1hie ltax Court and the Fifth Circuit held that the
cancellation of debt was excljded from the corporation's income as a contri-
bution to its capital. 211 'Ihe Ix Court also elxd that the shareholder did not
recog-niz income; while that ruling on the shareholder's income seems incor-
rect, the government did not appeal.21 2 Congress responded to that decision
by adding section 108(e)(6) in 1980.
Sect ion 108( e)(6) provides that a shareholder's discharge of a corporatiots
debt will not be excluded from the corporationIs income under section 118,
and the corporatiort ca( recognize income to the extent that the alount of
the debt exceeds the shareholder's basis therein. Specifically, section 118 is
inapplicable. 'lhe corporation is treated as having paid the creditor at amourt
equal to the creditor's basis in the debt, and the excess of the debt over that
amourt is treated as COD. Ihe corporation will include the COD in itcome
unless another exclusion applies.
V. The Tax Benefit Rule
if a taxpayer deducted art item ort his federal tax return and enjoyed a tax
benefit thereb, a subsequent recovery of any of the deducted item will cause
2°9V 1_" YOU1ng, Inc. v. Comnrnissioner, I2 E2d 1-, 164 (1st i1 1941).
21]RC 2503(b).
Putonma Corp, . Commissiorjer 66 TC, 652. 675 (1976), afd, 601 t2d '734 (5th C"%
19'9)7
Pvtorna, 6T(_. t 675C'.
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the taxpayer to recognize income2 3 This treatment is referred to as the tax
benefit rule. ihe rule has both an inclusiontary and an exclusionary compo-
nent: the recovery is included in the taxpayer's income to the extent that the
taxpayer obtained a tax benefit from the prior year's deduction, and the recov--
ery is excluded from the taxpayer's income to the extent that the prior year s
deduction did inot provide a tax benefit, " 'Ihe exclusionary aspect of the tax
benefit rule is codified in section I1 I
Section 111(a) excludes from income the recovery ot a previously deducted
item "-to the extent such amount did not reduce the amount of tax imposed
by this chapter." Accordingly, if only part of a deduction provided the tax-
payer with a tax benefir, a recovery of a portion of the deducted item is first
treated as a recovery of the part: thlat did not provide a tax benefit, and only
the amount of recovery in excess of the excluded amount will be included in
the taxpayer's income.
When an accrual method taxpayer was allowed a deduction for an accrued
but unpaid expense, the subsequent canceilation of that debt may cause the
taxpayer to recognize income under the tax benefit doctrine even when the
canc Hation would not otherwise have caused COD income because of the
application of the transactional approach."" However, if the taxpayer did not
derive a tax benefit from all or part of the deduction, then that arriount of
cancelled debt will be excluded from the taxpayer's gross income by section
11l](a). 'ihe Service expressly ruled section 111 applies to a canceflation of
debt in such circumstances. *'
As noted above, it a taxpayer deducted an accrued liability ad obtained a
tax benefit for it, the cancellation of that debt usually will cause the debtor to
recognize income. One exception is where the cancellation constitutes a gifIt.
In Revenue Ruling 76-316, the Service ruled that when a subsidiary corpo-
ration accrued and deducted unpaid interest owing on a debt to its parent
corporation, and obtained a tax benefit from those deductions, the parents
cancellation of that debt caused the subsidiary to recognize income under
the tax benefit rule. The Service rejected the contention that the cancellation
should be treated as a contribution by the parent to the capital of the sub-
sidiary that is excluded from income by section 118(a). The Tax Court and
the Fifth Circuit came to a contrary view in Putona, holding the cancellation
in such circumstances was excluded from the debtor's income. ' 1 As noted
previously in Part IV.B. of this Article, Congress adopted section 1 08(e)(6) to
change the result reached in Pitoina. Congress precluded the application of
section 118 in such circumstances and requires the corporation usually to rec-
ognize income to the extent the COD exceeds the creditor's basis in the debt.
.See generatly Dobson v. Commissioner, 32) U.S. 489 (1943) (disussing the tax benet
rule, although not f1romaiv adopting i).
2Sce Hilisboro Nat'l Bankv. C ommissioner, 460' .S. 370, 330-81 n.12 11983).
"'See il' a Part Vt.
2'6Rev, Rul, 67-200, 1967-1 C.B. P;.
17 Putoma, 601 [2d a r 751.
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Congress did not take any action with regard to a donative cancelation of
a debt° A gratuitous cancellation of a debt that comes within the purview of
section 102 is excluded fiom the debtor's income regardess of whether the
debtor had prtviously deducted the item and obtained a tax benefit therc-
from."'' If a third partv had made a gift of cash to the debtor who then used
that cash to satisty the debt, there would be no question ot the debtor's rec-
ognizing income. If the creditor had made a cash gift to the debtor who then
used the cash to satisfy the debt, the debtor would not recognize income, A
cancellation of the debt as a gift to the debtor is substantively equivalent to
giving cash to the debtor followed by the debtor's payment of the debt, 'Ihere
is no reason to treat the cancellation as income to the debtor.
VI. Transactional Approach
A. 6enerad
While the courts have utilized a transactional approach in some cascs,29 it
has a bad reputation because of its misuse by the Supreme Court in Kerbaugh-
npie'e.22 ° Whten properly applied, the approach is appropriate and helpful.
The transactional approach is actually an element of what we described earlier
in this Article as the proper standard for determining whether a forgiveness
of a debt constitutes COD that may be included in income. As discussed
earlier, the proper explatnation for taxing COD as income is not because of
an increase in the debtor's net worth. A forgiveness should be treated as COD
income only if the debt prevented the debtor from recognizing income for the
receipt of something or permitted the debtor to take a deduction or obtain a
basis in property. If note of those situations exist, the forgiveness should not
be treated as COD income. The transactional approach is useful to determine
whether the standards for imposing COD treatment have been met.
The gist of the transactional approach is to examine the entire transaction
beginning with the creation of the debt aid ending with the cancellaiono 2 if
the debtor did not obtain a tax benefit because of the debt, the debtor should
rtot have COD income. 'ihe tax bentefit could be the receipt of cash or ot her
property that would have been income to the debtor if the presence of the
debt had not prevented the recognition of income, 'Ihe tax benefit could be a
deduction or the acquisition of basis that was made possible by the presence
of the debt. Even in the case ofan acquisition ot basis, there are circumstances
where a transactional approach will exclude the cancellation of the debt from
income. in the case of a deduction, income vvili be recognized only to the
extent that the deduction provided a tax benefit.
2 1 seei
2S95e, e., Bradfiwd v. C ommissioncr, 233 E2d 935 (6th 1056); Commissiorne v. Rail
Ioint Co., 61 E2d 751 (2d Cir. 1932).
>' cc. ( g,, Biurnct v, Sanfiord & Brooks Co, 282 U.S. 359 3(5 (1931); Vukasovich ,.
Commissioncr, 790 F.2d 1409 14V;-6 (9th Cir. 1986).
"'See Bowers v. Kerbauigh-Empire, 271 U.S, 170, 175 (1926).
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An obvious situation in which the transactional approach is valid is the
illustration we used earlier in this Article of a legally binding promise to make
a gift to a qualified charity where the charity subsequently forgives part of'
that promise. Another example is where a corporation pays a dividend to
its shareholder in the form of a distribution of the corporations bond in the
principal amount and fair market value of $1,000 In a subsequent year, the
corporation purchases the bond from the shareholder for $800. The corpora-
tion should not have COD income from that transaction. 'Ihe effect of the
transaction is that what appeared to be a $1,000 dividend to the shareholder
was retroactively changed to an $800 dividendo'2
The following illustrations demonstrate the operation of the trans-
actional approach,
Illustration 1. in Year One, Paul opened a gourmet restaurant in Grand
Rapids, Michigan° Paul hired a prominent chef and contracted to pay her a
salary of $15,000 per month for five years. Paul reports his income on the
accrual metihod, and the chef reports her income on the cash method. In its
first two years of operation, the restaurant was slow to be accepted and did
not produce the income that Paul had anticipated. Consequently, Paul was
unable to pay the chef the fhii amount of her monthly salary By the end of
Year 'ITo, the shortfall amounted to $20,000 that was owing to the chef as
unpaid wages. Despite that disappointment, Paul and the chef were con-
vinced that the restaurant would prosper in the imm ediate future. In order
to facilitate the future success of the restaurant, the chef agreed to forgive the
$20,000 of back salary owed to her. Paul was solvent at that time. W/c will
consider the tax consequences of the cancellation of that $20,000 debt in the
following three alternative circumstances,
(a) On his tax return for Years One and Two, Paul accrued and deducted
the unpaid salary to the chef, and Paul obtained a tax benefit from that dcduc--
tion. Under the tax benefit rule,> the COD that occurred in Year Three will
be included in Paul's income for that year.
(b) The same facts as those stated in (a), except that Paul did not obtain
a tax benefit firom the accrued deductions he rook fohr the chef's utpaid sal--
ary. In that situation, section 11 (a) will excljde the cancellation from Paul'
income. '24 In Revenue Ruling 67- 200, the Service ruled that sectior 111 (a)
applied in a comparable circumstance. Note that while Paul got no benefit
fioni taking the deduction, Paul did get the benefit of the chef's services, and
nevertheless the COD is excluded from Pauis income. The reason for that
treatment is explained in (c) below.
(c) The same facts as in (a), except that in his tax returns for Years One and
Evo, Paul had crroeously failed to claim a deduction for the tpaid salary.
'
22
ce RailJoinrt o., 61 E2d at 752.
""See HiIbo:} Mat'/Bank, 460 US. at 3-89.
2111 RC. I11 (a) (; statutory application of orn. aspect of the tax berefir rule, which is
described supra Parr V
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In that situation, because no deduction was taken, neither the tax benefit
rule nor section 111(a) is applicable. Nevertheless, the COD is riot includled
in Paul's income because of the transactional approach, in effiect, what has
occurred is that the parties agreed on a specified amount of salary for the
chef's services, and then retroactively changed the amount of her wages by
cancC ling the $20,000 debt in Year 'Three. If Paul arid the chef had set her
wages at a lower figure at the time she was hired, Paul would not have recog-
rizcd income even if that meant he paid the chef a lower wage than the fair
value of her services. The cancellation of the debt puts the parties in the same
position they would have occupied if the original conttact had provided fir a
lower salary Putting it another way, Paul never received anything that would
have been taxable to hin if the debt had not existed, nor did he obtain a
deduction. The transactional approach is a useful means of exploring whether
the standards of imposing income for a COD have been mct.
Illustration 2. Rachel owns and operates a boutique retail dress shop in
Columbus, Ohio. In Year One, she bought a line of dresses from a French
manufacturer for E4,000. She bought the dresses on credit, and so she was
indebted to the manufacturer for the (4,000. At the time that she incurred
the debt, (4,000 had a value of $6,000 (U.S.). By March of Year Two, the
value ofeuros had falen against the dolar so that Rachel was able to purchase
(4,000 for $4,000 in U.S. currency Rachel then used those (4,000 to pay
her debt to the French manufacturer. Did Rachic recognize ordirnary income
because of having paid back the loan of (4,000 with currency that had a
lower value than it had when she borrowed it?
in Curch's F-glish Shoes, Ltd v. Connissioner, the Second Circuit held that
in similar circ umstances involving the purchase of foreign shoes on credit, the
debtor recognized income on repaying the debt with foreign currency that
had fallen inl Va'le. 221 'ihe court noted the transactional approach used in
Kerbaz.zh-Enpire, but it concluded that that approach did nor apply in the
English Shoes case because there was no showing that the debtor suffered a loss
on the sale of the shoes.221. While the result reached in that case was correct,
the court's construction of the transactional approach was incorrect,
The debtor's income or loss on the sale of the items is irrelevant. In the facts
of this Illustration 2, it is of no significance to the tax treatment of the COD
what amount of income or loss Rachel had on the sale of the dresses. Tbe
application of the transactional approach would be to change Rachel's basis
in the dresses she bought to reflect that they cost less than originally expected.
'the difficuiry with that approach is that some or ali of the dresses may have
been sold before the debt was cancelled. it is not practical to go back and alter
the income recognized on those sales. How should the COD be treated then?
One possible treatment is to conclude that the transactional approach is nor
available here because the parties cannot be put back into the same positron
225229 F.2d 957 (2d Cir 1956),
21d. At 958.
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they would have occupied if the lower price for the dresses had been known
at the time of their purchase. 'Ihat would result in ordinary income to Rachel
in the amount of the COD. An alternative approach, which reaches the same
result, is to apply the t ransactional approach in the' tollowing man ner° In
calculating Rachel's income from the dress shop for Year !hree, reduce her
opening inventory by the amount of the COD, and do not change her clos-
ing inventory. That will reduce Rachel's cost of goods sold for that year, and
so will increase her ordinary income by the amount of the COD
Illustration 3. In Year One, Henry purchased undeveloped land from
Ruth. Henry paid Ruth $20,000 cash tan took the land subject to an
$80,000 nonrecourse debt that is payable to Ruth. Interest only is payable on
the nonrecourse debt for four years, after which thc principal of the debt is
payable in installments over a ten-year period. Henry made all of the interest
payments on time.
in Year Three, Ruth agreed to forgive $10,000 of the debt, thereby reduc-
ing the principal of the debt from $80,000 to $70,000, Henry was solvent at
that time. At the time of the cancellation, the land had a value of $125,000.
Under the transactional approach, Henry did not recognize income on the
cancellation of $10,000 of the debt. Instead, Henry's basis in the land wouldbe reduced from $1 00,000 to $90,000. '_Ihe transaction should be treated as
a reduction of the purchase price for the land.
'Ihe same result is reached by the application of Code section 108(c)(5)
(B), the purchase-money debt exclusion, it is clear from that overlap that
the purchasc-money debt statutory exclusion is actually an application of the
transactional approach to a specific circumstance.
'Ihe laKrn case provides an excellent e xample of how the transact ional
approach can be useful in applying the COD rules. 2 / In that case, a majority
of thte tax Court arrived at the wrong result and was reversed by a divided
decision of the Third Circuit.""s The Third Circuit's majorit was probably
influenced by a desire to avoid the harshness of the 'lix Court's decision. Jo
arrive at the result for the taxpayer, the Third Circuit advanced two indepen-
dent rat ionales neither of which is convincing. 'Ii facts of the larin case are
set forth below.
'Ihe taxpayer in Zarin was a corripulsive gambler, He did most of his gam-
bling at a hotel (hereinafter referred to as "the Hotel-) in Atlantic Cit. in
1978, he was given a line ot credit of $10,000 at the Hotel. Within a year and
a half, his line of credit was increased to $200,000.22 9
Gambling at the Hotel was done with chips provided by the casino. 'Ih-e
chips could not be used outside of the casino for any purpose. Taxpayer's
line of credit allowed him to obtain chips Cromn the casino with which to
gamble. To obtain the chips, taxpayer signed negotiable drafts commonly
> Zarin ,,. Commissioner, 916 }.2d 10 (3d Ci. 1990), revG 92 iE. 1084 (1989)
2 2;'Id
229id. Ii 1i]" ,
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cafled "markers." The Hotel wouid hold the markers for about 90 days after
which taxpayer would redeem them by giving the Hotel his personal check. 230
in 1979, the New Jersey Casino Control Commission ordered the Hotel
to cease and desist giving credit in excess of a properly approved credit limnit.
The complaints of credit abuse that led to the cease and desist order included
100 instances of abuse in providing credit to the taxpayer and a gambling
companion. in violation of that order, the Hotel substantialy increased the
credit that taxpayer could draw upon to purchase chips. 231
By 1980, taxpayer was gambling daily at the Hotel and betting heavily
By April 1980, the Hotel held personal checks and markers fromi taxpayer
in the aggregate amount of $3,435,000. he Hotel was unable to collect on
the checks, which were re turned bccause of insufficient funds. 'ihe Hotel
sued taxpayer for the unsatisfied amount, and the suit was settled by the tax-
payer's paying the Hotel $500,000 in discharge of the $3,435,000 debt. 'Ihe
government claimed that this settlement resulted in raxpayer's having COD
income in the amount of $2,935,000. With accumulated interest, the Service
claimed that the taxpayer's tax iiability was over $5,000,000. A majority of
the Tax Court upheld the Strvice's position and held that the taxpayer owed
that amount,
22
One of the issues in Zarin was whtether the taxpayers gambling debts
were enforceable. The excessive credit granted by the iHotd to taxpayer in
contravention of a cease and desist order made the enforceability of those
debts highly questionable. Because of the procedural framework in which
the case arost, the Service had the burden of proof otn that question. Because
the Service could not meet its burden of' proof, both the Tax Court and the
'Third Circuit treated the debts as unenforceable at the time that they were
incurred 3
in a 2-1 decision, the 'Iifird Circuit reversed tht latx Court and held that
the cancellation of the debt did not cause the taxpayer to recognize income.
2
"
'The court gave two independent reasons for its decision, and neither holds up
well under scrutiny.
One basis for the court's decision rtested on the unenforceabilitv of the
debt. Section 61(a)(12) states that cancellation of indebtedness is included in
the debtor's gross incotie° 'ihe majority of the court hteid that the meaning
of indebtedness in section 61 (a) (12) is the same as the definition of that term
in section 108(d)(1) Ihat provision defints indebtedness of a taxpayer cis
either a debt for which the taxpayer is liable, or a debt to which property of
the taxpayer is subject. Because the debt was unentorceable, the taxpayer was
230d.
"Ia'. ar I2.
2f
214Id. at 1t7.
3"-iee4 at 113,
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not liable for it. 2 -3' The court concluded therefore that the taxpayer did not
have COD income when the debt was canciJed. 2
37
The problem with that approach is pointed out in the dissent. The dissent
contends the debt must: be given recognition by the tax law, bccause if not
the taxpayer would have had income when he acquired the chips.23 if the
taxpayer were treated as having borrowed money from the Hotel to purchase
the chips, he would have had income on the receipt of the money unless his
"debt" was recognized as an offset that kept him from recognizing intcoe.,239
The dissent concluded that either the taxpayer had income when he
acquired the chips or he had income when the debt was torgiven. 240 Whie
the dissent discloses a flaw in the majority's rationale, we wiil show that the
dissent is not correct either. One way to deal with the problem posed by the
dissent is to hold that an unenforceable debt should prevent recognition of
income for so long as there is no indication that the debtor does not intend
to pay. Once it is known that the debtor will not pay the debt, then the
reecipt of value that the debtor obtained when the debt arose is taken into his
income unless the discharge can be seen as a reduction of purchase price. in
the Zain case, the taxpayer never received anything of value whose purchase
price could not be adjusted when the amount of debt was reduced.
'ihe second basis on which the majority of the court grounded its decision
is the so-caied "contested liability" exception to COD income. The court
stated that the settlement of' a disputed or contested liability does not cause
COD income.2 1' The court cited cases where there was a settlement of a dis-
pute as to the amount o debt that was owed. 242 'ie settlement at a lower
figure than claimed by the creditor did not cause the debtor to recognize
income. 'ihe court concluded that the sarrie doctrine applied when the debtor
contended that there was no debt at all, and so the court applied the doctrine
to the taxpayer.24
3
The court's use of the contested liability exclusion is unsound. The question
should be whether the settlement can properly be characterized as establish-
ing the price paid for a purchased item. The Third Circuit set forth a hypo-
thetical to illustrate what it meant by the contested liabilito exclusion, 244 and
that hypothetical illustrates the error in the court's use of that concept. The
courts hypothe tical involves a taxpayer who borrows $ 10,000, and then, in
good faith, refuses to repay the faf amount. The debt is settled for a payment
of $7,000. hIbe court: concluded that the taxpayer would have no income
_7 U. at 114.
21I. at 1 8 (Staplcton, J. dissniting),
239]d.
240](Jd,
A. at 1'5-16 hrmajorit' opinion).
'Id, at 1 15,
243 d3
.<la
"
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for sertling for that amount 2 It is obvious that this conclusion is incorrect.
'the borrower obtained $10,000 cash and returned only $7,000. ihe $3,000
cash he received that was not included in his income because of the debt is
now fi-ee from any liabilit. Regardless of" what legitimate reasons there might
be for the borrower to not be liable for part of that debt, the borrower must
include $3,000 in income when that aImount of the debt is cancelled,
The Tenth Circuit rejected the Third Circuit's use of the contested liability
exclusion in Pr(1s.r v. (_,omnsdioner. 'Ihe ,enth Circuit held that the con--
tested liability exclusion does not apply to a debt whose amount is certain but
whose enforceability is challenged. 'Ihe court held that the ewclusion applies
only when the amount of a debt is in question. The court distinguished liqui-
dated debts from unliquidated debts.
In our view, there is either no contested liabilitv exclusion or there should
not be one. '1ie issue should be resolved by detcrmining whether the reduc-
tion of the debt at the time it was incurred would have resulted in the debtor's
recognition of income. If not, the cancellation of the debt does not cause the
debtor to recognize income. On the other hand, if the redaction of the debt
at thc outset would have resulted in the debtor's recognizing income, the can-
cellation should be income to the debtor unless some other exclusion applies.
Consider the facts of the Zarin case. What did the taxpayer purchase in
that case? fie did not purchase the chips. Any chips remaining when he
finished gambling were returned to the Hotel. What he purchased was the
opportunity to gamble. The chips he received served merely as an account-
in- device to determine how much he won or lost. If a gambling house
were to charge a patron $1 for each $3 chip he acquires, and if the patron
is returned only $i for each such chip he returns to the house, all that the
patron acquires is a gambling program in which he receives a return of $3 for
each $1 he bets. 'Ihe house can set whatever price it chooses for the privilege
of gambling and can ser whatever return it chooses for winnings. The patron
would not have income for having purchased chips for less than their face
amount. The face amount of the chips is merey the means of calculating
gains and losses, '1he cancellation of the debt in Zarin can be seen through
the transactional approach as nothing more than a redaction of the cost of
the gambling experience°
B. fYhid harty Crediiors and the Iransac-ionalApproach
NWe have seen that the reduction of a purchase-money debt by the seller of
the property will be treated as a reduction of the property's purchase price.
That provision does not apply if the creditor is not the seller. Similarl, the
transact ional approach applies to change the terms of a transaction only when
the creditor is a principal party to the transaction. Are there circumstances
245Iad t i 6.
246-1671 F3d 1323 (10rh Cir. i999),
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where a form of transactional approach can be used even though the creditor
is a third party?
One circumstance in which there is a remote possibility for utilizing that
approach is wh ere the third party creditor was so connected to the sale of an
item as to make it reasonable to treat a reduction of the debt as a reduction of
the purchase price. For example, a bank holds a mnortgage on property whose
owner is in bankruptcy. The bank is eager to find a buyer for the property to
take over the mortgage liability. ihe bank solicits an offer from the taxpayer
to purchase the property and offers very liberal terms for a mortgage in order
to induce the taxpayer to buy. ihe taxpayer accepts the offer and purchases
the property. Subsequently, the mortgagee forgives a part of the debt. Can the
mortgagee be so tied to the sale of the property that a reduction of the debt
can be treated as a reduction of the purchase price of the propery? That is a
difficult contention to sustain, but it is a possibility. 'ihere are two 'Thx Court
decisions that adopted that view. fReednm Newspapes, Inc. e. Commissioner
did not involve a COD, but the principles invoived are sim-tilar.24 7 In that
case, a broker gave a potential buyer a guaranty that the buyer could resell
one of several properties that were for sale in order to induce the buyer to
purchase the properties.2 41 The Tax Court held that a subsequent payment
by the broker pursuant to his guaranity constitutes a reduction of the buyer's
purchase price and was not income to the buyer.241 The court relied on the
involverient of the broker in inducing the taxpayer to buy. 25t ihe result in
that case could be explained on other grounds, 21 but it does provide some
support for this propositiono Another case supportinig this approach is Broun
v. Commnissioler.252 On the other hand, the decision of the Tenth Circuit in
Nres/ar v )o;Cnmissioner impliedily rejected that approach.253 '111,c prospects for
prevailing on this contention are not strong.
in Revenue Ruling 92-99, the Cornmissioner deterrmined that a discharge
of a debt by a third party caused the debtor to recognize income. Surprisingly,
however, the Commissioner made the following statement in his ruling:
l-h, enice will, however, treat a debt reduction in third--party lender cases
as a purchase price adjustment to the extent that the debt reduction by the
third party is based on an infirtnity d1hat ('early rel.Ites back to he origiual
sale (eg., to the seller's inducement of a highcr purchase prie by misrepre-
24.,Se Freedom Newspapes [Inc, v. Commissioner, 36 RITCM. (CCIH) I 755,T C.M (P-H)
77,429 9 977).
,at 1756, TC.M, (P-H) 77,4291 a- 1751 (1977).
249Ia' at 1759, TC.M (P-H) q 77,429, at 1751 (1977).250]d.
exclusion fimm income could be explained by trcating the gluranixy a mir to
insurance, and so the recept of the pymmrnt would be a reduction of the taxpayer's capital.
H owmcr, that is not the basis of -the court s decision.
25- 0 B&T A 10 6,n1054-5 (1928) ,
'Preslar v Cormmissioner, 167 E.3d 1323, 133 2--33 0 th Cir, 1999).
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sentarion of a material fact or by fraud)... No other debt reduction by a
third party lender will be treated as a purchase price reduction,"4
ihe concession made by the Commissioner in that statement appears to
be overly generous. It is difficult to see why a misrepresentation by the seller
should affect the characterizaton of a discharge by a third party. Perhaps
the Commissioner's position is based on an assumption that the third parry
would not cancel a part of the debt because of a misrepresentation or firaud
of the seller trless the third party had played a role in the seler's effort to sell
the property and perhaps participated in the fraud or misrepresentation itself.
Even if the third party's involvement in the sale should affect the treatment
of the discharge, it is generous simply to assume that involverment: and not
require evidence of it.
VIL Mixed Sale and Cancellation of Indebtedness
When property is secured by a debt, and when the debt is satisfied by the
creditor's receipt of the property, the tax consequences depend upon whether
the debt is a recourse or a nonrecourse debt.
A. Recourse Debt
Consider this situation. Roger owns improved realty, (Blackacre), which is
security for a recourse debt of $300,000 owed to Friendly Bank. 'ihe Batikwas
not the seller of Bliackacre to Roger. Roger's basis in Blackacre is $280,000.
Ithe fair rrarket value of Blackacre is $220,000. Roger defaults on the debt
and the Bank forecloses and sefls the property for its value of $220,000. 25
Roger was solvent. Because it is a recourse debt, Roger remains iable to the
Bank for the $80,000 deficiency that the Bank failed to obtain from its fore-
closure sale, S Because Roger is still liable for that $80,000, there has been
no cancellation of a debt, and Roger has no incomae. 257 Roger effectively sold
Blackacre for $220,000, and so Roger recognizes a loss of $60,000," If the
Bank subsequently forgives the unpaid debt, then at that time Roger would
have CO). 2 9
Alternatively, the Friendly Bank agrees to accept the receipt of Blackacre in
satisfaction of the entire $300,000 of the recourse debt, In that c ircurnstan cc,
Roger has no further liabilitv on the debt.26° 'hfe result is that Roger recog-
rnizes a loss of $60,000 on the use ofBilackacre to satisfy $220,000 of the debt,
"'Rev. Ru[. 92-99, '992-2 C.B. 35.
if the sale of Blackacre was t arms lenth, the courts will accept the seing price as repre.-
senring the fair marker value of he properry. If rhe seller and rhe buyer are nor at arm's length,
the court wAl apply its own. estimate of the value of the property, See Frazier v, Coririmssioner,
I I [TC. 243, 246.-47 (!998).
2 'Yr ii at 249,
5e eAzawa v. Comm;issoner, 99 f.(C. 197, 99-200 (1992)
"'See id. at 201.
259See id.
S'° ee ,,,
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and Roger has COD of' $80,000 for the balance of the debt that was forgiven
by the Bank,.'1 Roger will recognize that $80,000 of COD as income unless
an exclusion applies. 262
B. vonrecourse Debt
'Ihe treatment of the transfer of encurnbred property in satisfaction of a
nonrecourse secured debt is different from that applied to a recourse debt.
Consider the Cacts of the situation described above except that: the debt tdhat
secures Blackacre and is owed to the Friendly Bank is a nonrecourse debt.
Because it is a nonrecourse debt, the Bank's only remedy for default by
Roger is to foreclose on Blackacre. The Bank forecloses, and the propertv is
sold for $220,000, which is its fair market value, Roger hs no hability to
pay the deficiency of $80,000 that the Bank did not collect on its debt. The
transaction is treated as a sale of Blackacre by Roger to the Bank for the full
amount of the nonrecourse debt ($300,000). Roger has a gain of' $20,000 on
the sale of Blackacre for $300,000 even though its valuc was only $220,000.
Roger has no COD income.
in her concurring opinion in the JTfis case, Justice O'Connor criticized the
rule treating recourse and nonrecourse debt differently.2 6' Justice O'ConnorZ, ' - P oeso asie Barnttonnaorh
was convinced by an anicus brief filed by Professor Vvin)ne Barnett that thc
better rule would be to treat both the same. 26 4 To the contrary, the current
rule is the proper one as a matter of good tax policy and principle,
in the case of the recourse debt, the transfer of the property does not relieve
the debtor of a liability for the deficiency. If the creditor chooses to forgive
the deficiency, that event is separate from the taking of the property. The pay-
ment on the debt is limited to the value of the property received by the credi-
tor, and the debtor has gain or loss firom the effective sale of the property for
the amount of its value. if the rest of the debt is forgiven by the creditor that
properi is treated as COD to which alli of the rules pertaining to COD apply.
'Ihe situation is very different in the case of a nonrecourse debt, Wihen
a lender agrees to provide a loan on a nonrecourse basis, the lender effec-
tively gives the borrower the option of either satisfying the debt with cash
or satisfi/ing it with the encumbered property. In essence, the borrower has
a put by which he has the option to stli the property to the lender at a price
equal to the amount of debt that is outstanding at the time in which the sale
takes place. In the non recourse problem above, when the creditor foreclosed
on Blackacre the debtor had no liability beyond the transfer of Blackacre
itself. So, there was no debt for the creditor to forgive. Instead, it was a sale
16! Reg, 1.1001-2(a)(2),-2(c), Ex, 8).
2('2A;awa, 99T.C. a 201.
""ICommssioncr v, Tufts, 461 US. 300, 317-18 (1983) (O'Conn-or, . concuring).
211Id. at 317. However, Justice O'Connor conlduded thr the rutc was too wll cstabished
to change it ra that ]R.er da.e. Id. .t 319-20.
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pursuant to the terms of the loan by which the debtor can sell the property
for the balance owing on the debt,
VIII. Decedent's Installment Note
When a decedent has been reporting gain on the installment method, and
on the decedent's death the irstallment: note passes to the decedent's estate or
to any other person other than the obligor, the recipient of the note wili have
income in respect of a decedent (IRD) to the extent the frace almount of thc
obligation exceeds the basis the decedent had in it.2 16 Tfhe recipient recognizes
that IRD pro rata as he receives installiment payments from the obligor unless
an event occurs that accelerates recognition of that income.""- -f]Te decedent's
basis at his death is determined under sectior 453B(b) as the excess of the face
value of the note over the amount that would have been treated as income to
the decedent if the debt had beert satisfied itt fIl?17 'hIe dectdent's estate or
the person who is entitled to the IRD by bequest or inheritance will report
income from each pavmient received on the note in the same proport ion that
the decedent would have reported it if he had lived and received those pay-
ments. 'Ihe character of the recipient's income is the same as it would have
been in the hands of the decedent.""',
'ihere is no gain to be reported on the decedert's final income tax return
because of the transmission of the note to the estate or to a beneficiary other
than at- obligor of the note.27° 'The tra-sfrer of the note because of the dece-
dent's death to anyone other than the obligor is not a disposition that acceler-
ates the recognition of the deferred gain. 271
if the estate or other person who holds the installment note sells it or gives it
awa, the disposition will cause the holder to recognize income under section
453(B) in an amount equal to the difference between the fair market value
of the note or the amount received in payment for it, -whichever is greater,
and the basis that the decedent had in the obligation.2 > The decedent's basis
it tIc obligation is reduced by any installtnent payments received after his
death that were not included in the holder's income.)" If the installment note
is sold to the obligor and the obligor was a related person to the decedent
(within the scope of the stature), the fair market value of the installment note
is treated as not being less than its face arnotlt 274
(IRC. 5 691(a)(4); Reg. 1691(a)-5(a.166'See I.RC ' 45B; e. 1691(GO.- 5(a).
45 - , teg. U 4) "a
267- 691 (a)(4).
Rcg. 1.691(a-5(a).
- 691 -a)(3).
271 691(a)(5)(A)(i); Reg. § 1 691(a)-5().
271 q 453B(c), 691(a)(2),
2;TReg 5 169It1 (a)-5(b), [he basis rhat the decedentr had in hc note at the time ofhis death
is the excess of the ";cc va t ue of he note over the aOu.:t that would be re 'ted as incone to
ie decedent if ic debt were satisfied in full. 4513B(b).
273 Re I .69 1 (a-5 (b)
. 69 1 (A) (5) (B).
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if the installment note is rransferred because of the death of the decedent
(i.e., made to the decedent's estate or to a beneficiary of' a bequest or inheri-
tance), the disposition does not cause the transferor to recognize income.2' 5
However, that excIusion from income does not apply if the transfer because
of death is made to the obligor of the note '6 if the transfer is made to the
obligor, it is equivlent to a cancellation of the note; and so the trarsferor is
required to recognize the deferred income.77
An installment note can contain a provision that cancels the note upon
the death of the holder. A note that contains that provision is relerred to as
a "self.cancelling installment note" (SCIN) or a "death termninating install-
ment note.' Tat is simply one form of cancelling the installment note and is
treated the same as any cancellation. 'lhe decedent's estate wil recognize the
deferred income as IRD.
A cancellatior of an nstallment note is treated as a disposition of the note
that triggers the holder's recognition of the remaining IRD.2 " The holder
will recognize IRD to the extent the fair mnarkct value of the note exceeds the
holder's basis. 27 T 7he effect of the cancellation is to require the immediate rec-
ognition of any income that had been deferred by the use of the instaflment:
method. if the obligor was a related person to the holder, the fair market
value of the note is deemed to be no less than the face amount of the note, 280
if the installment note becomes unentorceable, that is treated as a disposi-
E:ion of the note, which requires the holder to recognize income 28 1
if an installment note is cancelled by the terms of the note on the holder's
dea:h, does the obligor have COD t:hat might be taxable? It would scemn that
the cancellation is a form of gift or bequest that is excluded from the obligor's
irtcomc by section 102.
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